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This Article considers the effect of the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. on the nonobviousness
standard for patentability as applied to pharmaceutical patents. By calling
for an expansive and flexible analysis and disapproving of the use of rigid
formulas in evaluating an invention for obviousness, KSR may appear to
make it easier for generic competitors to challenge the validity of drug
patents. But an examination of the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness
jurisprudence in the context of such challenges reveals that the Federal
Circuit has been employing all along the sort of flexible approach that the
Supreme Court admonished it to use in KSR. The decisions of the Federal
Circuit considering obviousness challenges to pharmaceutical patents suggest
that the pharmaceutical industry does indeed have a nonobviousness
problem, but that problem is not KSR. Rather, the problem is that many of
the patents that the industry relies upon are invalid for obviousness under
time-honored patent doctrine. Although perhaps able to survive the limited
scrutiny that is possible on the basis of the information available at the
prosecution stage, these patents cannot withstand a validity challenge with
the benefit of a full evidentiary record at the infringement stage. It is more
difficult to conduct an expansive and flexible analysis with limited
information. KSR is more likely to have an impact on pharmaceutical
patents if it makes it easier for the PTO to reject patent applications for
obviousness in the first instance. It remains to be seen whether it will do so.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,' the U.S. Supreme Court
admonished the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to avoid the use
of "rigid and mandatory formulas" in applying the (non)obviousness
standard for patentability.2 At issue in that case was the Federal Circuit's
application of the so-called "TSM" test, which calls for finding a
"teaching, suggestion, or motivation" to combine elements from the
prior art before holding a new combination of old elements to be
obvious. But the opinion suggests that the Supreme Court is more
broadly skeptical of efforts to reduce the (non)obviousness inquiry to a
formula, preferring the "expansive and flexible approach" that has
characterized its own decisions on the issue over the past 150 years.
An important 9uestion that has surfaced in early commentary about
the KSR decision is its impact on pharmaceutical patents.' The
127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007).
2 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). In the text I use the term "(non)obviousness," with
internal parentheses around the prefix, to mean "obviousness or nonobviousness."
KSR Int'l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1730. Prior to the KSR decision, the Federal Circuit
required finding a teaching suggestion or motivation to make the claimed invention
in order to find it obvious when the invention combined elements from the prior art
or otherwise modified the prior art. The required teaching, suggestion, or motivation
could be found in the prior art itself, in the nature of the problem, or in the
knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the field. See, e.g., In re Dembiczak, 175
F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
' E.g., Posting of Jacob Goldstein to Wall Street Journal Health Blog, Supremes'
Decision Leaves Pharma Patents Vulnerable, http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2007
/04/30/supremes-decision-leaves-pharma-patents-vulnerable (Apr. 30, 2007, 18:11
EST); Harold C. Wegner, Post-KSR Chemical Obviousness in Light of Pfizer v. Apotex
(June 13, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, http://www.patenthawk.com/blogdocs
/070613_PostKSRChemicalObviousness.pdf); D. Benjamin Borson, KSR v. Teleflex,
Inc.: The Supreme Court Reviews Obviousness, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 523
(2007); Steven J. Lee & Jeffrey M. Butler, Teaching, Suggestion and Motivation: KSR v.
Teleflex and the Chemical Arts, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 915
(2007).
' Although the invention at issue in KSR was not a chemical or pharmaceutical,
amicus briefs alerted the court to the potential impact of the case on the
pharmaceutical patents. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA) filed an amicus brief in support of respondents arguing that the Federal
Circuit's TSM test provides a workable and objective standard of patentability that
gives its members confidence that they can enforce their patents against free riders.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
in Support of Respondents, KSR International v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007)
(No. 04-1350), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supremecourt/briefs/
04-1350/04-1350.mer.ami.pharm.pdf. On the other side, the AARP filed an amicus
brief arguing that the Federal Circuit's TSM test made it too easy to get patents on
obvious combination drugs. See Brief of AARP, et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-
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pharmaceutical industry is famously dependent upon patent protection
to exclude generic competitors from the markets for new drugs, but not
all of the patents that support exclusivity cover breakthrough inventions.
Many patents cover variations on successful drugs, such as metabolites,
different salts, or stereoisomers of the active ingredient, new
formulations such as time-release capsules or larger dosages that can be
taken less frequently, or new combinations of old drugs. The KSR
decision could potentially strengthen the hand of generic drug
companies who challenge the validity of these patents by making it easier
to show that the claimed inventions would have been obvious at the time
they were made.
One reason to expect as much is that the Federal Circuit and its
predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), have
articulated an approach to evaluating the (non) obviousness of chemical
inventions, including pharmaceuticals, that sometimes seems as "rigid
and mandatory" as the TSM approach at issue in KSR. Under this
approach, a patent examiner (or a challenger of an issued patent) must
first show that a claimed molecule is prima facie obvious by identifying a
"structurally similar" molecule in the prior art and by showing motivation
to modify that prior art molecule to create the claimed invention. The
inventor may then overcome the prima facie case of obviousness by
showing "surprising properties" for the claimed molecule not present in
the prior art. This approach originally forced patent examiners to be less
rigid in evaluating the patentability of modified chemicals, by directing
them to consider properties as well as structure.7 In some biotechnology
cases, however, it has functioned as a virtual per se rule of
nonobviousness for molecules that are not structurally similar to
molecules disclosed in the prior art.8 To the extent that KSR disapproves
the use of such "rigid and mandatory formulas," it calls into question the
Federal Circuit's approach to chemical (non)obviousness.
Moreover, the most compelling argument in support of the TSM
approach loses some of its force in the chemical context. That argument
is that the discipline of identifying a teaching, suggestion or motivation
1350), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supremecourt/briefs/
04-1350/04-1350.mer.ami.aarp.pdf.
6 In reDillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692-93 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
7 In rePapesch, 315 F.2d 381, 386 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
' For example, in In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995), the Federal Circuit
held that a DNA sequence encoding a polypeptide for which the prior art disclosed a
partial amino acid sequence was nonobvious, although the prior art provided ample
motivation to clone the DNA sequence with all but certain success. Since the partial
amino acid sequence was not "structurally similar" to the claimed DNA sequence, the
court concluded that the PTO had failed to establish that the DNA sequence was
prima facie obvious. Following KSR, the PTO appears to be reconsidering the vitality
of In re Deuel. See Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1410 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 2007);
Examination Materials for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103 in View of
the Supreme Court Decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 72 Fed. Reg.
57526, 57532 (Oct. 10, 2007). See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
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to make the invention prior to the inventor's own contribution tends to
counteract the "hindsight bias" that confounds efforts to evaluate, after
the fact, whether an invention would have been obvious at the time it was
made. The Federal Circuit has quite explicitly deployed the TSM
approach to guard against the "hindsight trap" that makes a new
invention seem obvious once an examiner or trial court knows what it is,
even though the same invention might not have been obvious at the time
it was made to an evaluator who only knew the prior art and was not yet
aware of the inventor's further contribution.9  By situating
nonobviousness analysis more explicitly in the pre-invention state of the
world, perhaps the TSM approach mitigates the hindsight bias.1 °
In the chemical context, the courts have had a different concern.
Although the hindsight bias could work against the patentability of some
chemical and pharmaceutical inventions, often these inventions appear
less obvious in hindsight than they seemed ex ante. Many standard
modifications of prior art molecules are obvious at least in the sense that
a chemist of ordinary skill would be motivated to make them and would
know how to make them, although there may be some uncertainty in
predicting the properties of the resulting molecules. Small changes in
the structure of a molecule sometimes bring about important changes in
properties. Surprising properties may show that a molecule that
appeared "structurally obvious" in light of the prior art is in fact a
nonobvious invention. These properties can only be observed ex post,
after the molecule has been made.
Although the rules for determining prima facie obviousness of new
chemicals echo the TSM approach in the use of rigid rules to protect
against hindsight, the rules for rebutting a prima facie case of
obviousness do the opposite. Rather than guarding against the use of
hindsight by situating the analysis in the pre-invention state of the world,
once prima facie obviousness is established the Federal Circuit's chemical
(non)obviousness analysis calls for the use of post-invention evidence to
compare the properties of new chemicals with those of the prior art. It
may even be necessary for an inventor to do further research after
reducing a new chemical to practice in order to show that surprising
properties of the new invention were not inherently present in
' In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365,
1369-71 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Recent
empirical work supports the Federal Circuit's concern, suggesting that it is extremely
challenging for people to ignore their knowledge of the invention and to make
faithful ex ante evaluations of nonobviousness. Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-
Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational,
67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1393-94 (2006) [hereinafter Mandel I]; Gregory N. Mandel,
Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court
in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALEJ.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2006) [hereinafter Mandel II].
"9 Professor Mandel, although supporting retention of the TSM test, is equivocal
about whether it succeeds as a safeguard against the hindsight bias. See Mandel I,
supra note 9, at 1425-36.
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structurally similar prior art chemicals. Rather than reminding examiners
and trial courts to confine their analysis to what would have been
apparent at the time the invention was made, the chemical
(non)obviousness rules thus invite them to consider new evidence that
was not available at the time of the invention. The chemical
(non)obviousness approach may thus suffer from the rigidity of the TSM
approach without the compensating virtue of situating the analysis in an
ex ante time frame."
Before such post-invention evidence becomes relevant to rebut a
prima facie case of obviousness, it is first necessary to show that the
invention is prima facie obvious, and this prima facie showing, like the
TSM test, is firmly anchored in an ex ante time frame. In a subset of
chemical patent cases involving claims to DNA sequences, the Federal
Circuit has applied the prima facie obviousness prong of its chemical
obviousness approach to establish, through a rigid rule, the
nonobviousness of inventions that might seem obvious under a more
expansive and flexible approach. 12 These cases seem inconsistent with
KSR and, should the Federal Circuit persist in this approach, it may be
vulnerable to another reversal by the Supreme Court.
The Federal Circuit articulates a similar proof structure in cases
considering the (non)obviousness of pharmaceutical patents. But recent
cases from the Federal Circuit considering the (non) obviousness of
pharmaceutical inventions reveal little of the rigidity of the DNA patent
cases, instead deploying the same tools with greater flexibility and
nuance. Many of these cases review decisions of U.S. District Courts in
patent infringement litigation at the point of generic entry into the
market for already successful pharmaceutical products, rather than
reviewing decisions of the PTO at the patent application stage. Far from
deciding these cases according to a rigid formula, the Federal Circuit
displays considerable sensitivity to context in evaluating each case on its
facts, with considerable deference to trial court findings. For the most
part, these cases do not support a view of the Federal Circuit as biased in
favor of patentability. Instead, most panels use the Federal Circuit's
doctrinal toolset, drawing on both its standard "TSM" approach and the
special rules for determining chemical obviousness, to distinguish
between inventions that required more than ordinary skill or achieved
surprising results and inventions that merely combined or modified old
products in predictable ways. The result is a growing body of case law
" To be sure, the use of hindsight in response to a prima facie showing of
obviousness often supports patentability, e.g., Knoll Pharm. Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA,
376 F.3d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2004), while in other contexts the use of hindsight
may be more likely to undermine patentability. But the selective use of hindsight only
when it favors patentability at a minimum calls into question the meaning of the anti-
hindsight shibboleth in (non)obviousness jurisprudence. Is the point to evaluate the
invention at the time it was made, or is the point to support patentability by choosing
the time frame that is most favorable to the inventor?
2 See infra notes 126-49 and accompanying text.
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invalidating for obviousness patents on modest changes to
pharmaceutical products that were already in the prior art at the time of
the invention. Some of these patents may succeed in forestalling generic
entry for a while, but ultimately fail to withstand validity challenges in
litigation.
In short, a review of the decisions of the Federal Circuit evaluating
the (non)obviousness of pharmaceutical patents in infringement actions
suggests that, in this particular context, the Federal Circuit for the most
part has been doing all along what the KSR court is now telling it to do. If
the pharmaceutical industry has a problem defending the
nonobviousness of its inventions in litigation, that problem appears to
predate KSR Rather than fortifying the (non)obviousness standard for
pharmaceutical inventions, perhaps KSR is more likely to lead the
Federal Circuit to apply similar rigor in cases involving simple
mechanical inventions.
But the pharmaceutical patent cases also show the limits of a
nuanced, case-by-case approach. Case-by-case analysis is costly, uncertain,
and time-consuming. A motivated challenger may find it worthwhile to
attempt the necessary showing in order to compete in the lucrative
market for a successful drug, but a patent examiner has fewer resources
available to establish obviousness at the application stage. While litigants
develop and courts evaluate a full evidentiary record in infringement
litigation, the patent remains in force, and the public pays a premium for
a product that should be available at competitive prices. For KSR to clear
the pharmaceutical marketplace of invalid patents on obvious inventions,
it would have to embolden examiners to reject the claims in the first
instance, on the basis of a more limited record and analysis.
Part II reviews the Federal Circuit's TSM test as a mechanism for
guarding against the hindsight bias and considers conflicting scholarly
accounts of how that test functions on the ground. Part III analyzes the
KSR decision and considers the extent to which it calls for departures
from the Federal Circuit's approach and the extent to which it affirms
that approach. Part IV reviews the distinct judicial approach to
(non)obviousness for chemical patents, including biopharmaceutical
patents, which has long sanctioned the use of post-invention evidence as
to the differences between the invention and the prior art to show that
inventions that may have appeared obvious at the time they were made
are nonetheless patentable. Part V turns to a closer examination of the
(non)obviousness jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit in the specific
context of pharmaceutical patents. I conclude that in those cases, which
primarily involve appeals from district court judgments in infringement
actions, the Federal Circuit does not display the sort of rigid, formulaic,
pro-validity analysis for which it has sometimes been faulted. Instead, in
this particular context, the Federal Circuit appears to have been
deploying all along an expansive and flexible approach. But although the
Federal Circuit has been willing to affirm the invalidity of litigated drug
patents on fully developed evidentiary records, it remains to be seen how
[Vol. 12:2
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far it will be willing to affirm rejections on the basis of more preliminary
showings at the prosecution stage.
II. TSM AND THE HINDSIGHT BIAS
The (non)obviousness standard for patent protection determines
how much an invention must differ from the prior art in order to qualify
for a patent. In theory, such a standard prevents the issuance of patents
on inventions that, although new, are so close to the prior art that the'
are likely to be forthcoming even without the incentive of a patent.
Section 103(a) of the Patent Act articulates the basic standard as follows:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
tide, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains.
This is an explicitly hypothetical inquiry, an ex post evaluation to
determine whether the invention would have been obvious at the time it was
made to a hypothetical evaluator, a person having ordinary skill in the art
(PHOSITA).
The Supreme Court, in its first encounter with this statutory
language in Graham v. John Deere, elaborated on the proper approach to
evaluating an invention for obviousness as follows:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at
issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or
" Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966) ("The inherent problem was
to develop some means of weeding out those inventions which would not be disclosed
or devised but for the inducement of a patent."). See also Edmund W. Kitch, Graham
v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 293, 301 (1966) ("The
non-obviousness test makes an effort, necessarily an awkward one, to sort out those
innovations that would not be developed absent a patent system .... the focus has
always been on the question whether the innovation could have been achieved by one
of ordinary skill in the art, or whether its achievement is of a greater degree of
difficulty."); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
363, 385-86 (2001) ("Ideally, under this view, a patent should be given for an
invention only if the invention would not have been developed but for the patent. If
the claimed invention would have been developed, commercialized, and disclosed
even without a patent, then granting or enforcing a patent would make little sense.")
(footnote omitted); Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7
HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1992); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards:
Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REv. 803 (1988); Cecil D. Quillen, Jr.,
Proposal for the Simplification and Reform of the United States Patent System, 21 AIPLA Q. J.
189, 204 (1993).
" 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
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nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light
to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter
sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness,
these inquiries may have relevancy."
The Supreme Court further explained that "secondary evidence" of
(non)obviousness (such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
needs, failure of others) "may... serve to 'guard against slipping into use
of hindsight,' and to resist the temptation to read into the prior art the
teachings of the invention in issue."
In exercising appellate review over evaluations of inventions for
(non)obviousness, the Federal Circuit has shown special concern with
preventing the PTO and courts from slipping into improper hindsight
analysis. This is a legitimate concern. Hindsight bias is a pervasive
problem in the administration of a legal rule that calls for hypothetical
ex ante evaluations and predictions by a trier who knows what happened
ex post." Gregory Mandel has argued on the basis of his own recent
empirical work that (non) obviousness determinations are especially likely
to be distorted by hindsight bias.18
383 U.S. at 17-18 (citations omitted).
6 383 U.S. at 36 (citations omitted).
17 There is a rich literature on the topic. For an early recognition of the problem,
see Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight x Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment
Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288
(1975). For more recent analyses with attention to implications for the legal system,
see JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theoy ofJudging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 571 (1998); Kim A. Kamin &JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Ex Post s Ex Ante: Determining
Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 89 (1995) and sources cited therein; and
Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 20
LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 501 (1996) and sources cited therein.
"S See Mandel I and Mandel II, supra note 9. Mandel presented different groups
of first-year law students with two hypothetical scenarios, including prior art
references and a problem to be solved, and asked them whether the solution to the
problem would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art. Half of
each group of students was further told that the problem had been solved, and the
solution was revealed to them. Students who had seen the solution (the hindsight
group) were far more likely to respond that a solution was obvious than those who
did not have this information (the foresight group). For the first scenario, 76% of the
students in the hindsight group responded that a solution would have been obvious,
and only 24% of those in the foresight group so responded. For the second scenario,
59% of the students in the hindsight group responded that a solution would have
been obvious, and only 23% of those who had not seen the solution responded it
would have been obvious. An interesting further result that Mandel reports but does
not discuss is that the spread between the foresight and hindsight respondents in
their perceptions of the likelihood that the hypothetical inventor would solve the
problem suggests a much smaller gap between the two groups. Asked to quantify this
likelihood on a scale of one to seven, with seven indicating that it was extremely likely
that the inventor would achieve the invention, the mean responses for the first
scenario were 4.40 in the foresight group and 5.41 in the hindsight group, and the
[Vol. 12:2
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It is worth noting, however, that resort to hindsight in analyzing
(non)obviousness is not simply a regrettable and inadvertent byproduct
of cognitive limitations. Hindsight analysis is built into the obviousness
inquiry as framed by Congress and elaborated by the Supreme Court.
Although section 103(a) sets the time frame for the hypothetical analysis
in the past-"at the time [the invention] was made"-it also directs the
evaluator to consider the ex post state of the world in making this
evaluation. The evaluation is to focus on "the [invention] as a whole" and
to consider "the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art."'9 This analysis is only possible ex post, when
the evaluator knows what the invention as a whole is and can compare it
to the prior art. The statutory analysis thus demands the use of a
hindsight perspective. Moreover, the palliative against the hindsight bias
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere-consideration
of secondary evidence-involves further use of ex post evidence.
Although some forms of secondary evidence (e.g., failure of others, long-
felt but unsolved need) may be observed ex ante, the most common
form-commercial success-may only be observed ex post.20
The Federal Circuit has fortified the relevance of evidence of
secondary considerations, sometimes substituting the term "objective
evidence" and giving it pride of place in the analysis alongside the other
primary factual inquiries identified by the Supreme Court in Graham v.
John Deere." It has characterized the ultimate determination of
(non)obviousness as a question of law subject to plenary review on
appeal, allowing itself to engage in active appellate review of obviousness
determinations. And in a further effort to guard against hindsight bias,
mean responses for the second scenario were 4.05 for the foresight group and 4.66
for the hindsight group. Mandel I, supra note 9, at 1406-10. Perhaps this reflects an
appreciation on the part of the law student survey respondents that the inventor is
likely to have greater skill in this arena than they themselves possess.
19 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
20 Professor Mandel surveyed nonobviousness decisions in the Federal Circuit
and district courts July 2004-December 2005 and found forty-one decisions that
analyzed secondary consideration evidence. The most common consideration in
these decisions was commercial success, which was considered in 33% of the cases.
Other secondary considerations noted in Mandel's data set that can only be
considered ex post include unexpected results (13% of cases), copying of the
invention (12%), skepticism toward the invention (6%), and acclamation by others in
the field (5%). Mandel I, supra note 9, at 1463.
" Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). See, e.g. Stratoflex, Inc. v.
Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (evidence of secondary
considerations often "the most probative and cogent evidence in the record."). But see
Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc. 480 F.3d 1348, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (discounting under
the heading of "secondary considerations" properties of claimed invention not
present in structurally similar prior art compounds).
" Aktiebolaget Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad & KMW v. U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 705 F.2d 1565, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court opinion in
Graham v. John Deere Co. was ambiguous on this point, although earlier decisions of
the Court had generally treated the presence or absence of patentable invention as a
2008]
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before holding a claimed invention obvious, the Federal Circuit has
required an identified "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" that would
lead a person having ordinary skill in the art to bridge the gap between
23the prior art and the invention. This requirement forces the PTO and
the courts to focus on the prior art and to articulate an evidentiary basis
for a conclusion of obviousness rather than relying on peremptory
intuitions and "common sense.
4
As a formal matter, the Federal Circuit has consistently
acknowledged that the necessary "suggestion" to extend or combine
prior art need not be explicit in prior art references, but might instead
be found in "the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art" or in "the
nature of the problem [to be] solved."25 But even when the suggestion is
implicit, it must be supported by "particular findings" rather than
"conclusory statements."6 The Federal Circuit has sometimes chastised
the PTO for invoking the high skill level27 or even "common sense, 28 of a
PHOSITA to explain why the differences between the prior art and the
claimed invention would have been obvious, accusing it of having fallen
into the "hindsight trap."
2 9
The Federal Circuit appeared especially demanding in its standards
for proof of motivation to combine references in its review of obviousness
determinations of the PTO in a series of cases following the decision of
the Supreme Court in Dickinson v. Zurko In that case the Supreme
Court held that, in reviewing findings of fact by the PTO, the Federal
Circuit must apply the less stringent standards of review set forth in the
Administrative Procedure Act rather than the "clearly erroneous"
standard of review that the Federal Circuit had been using. Rather than
increasing its deference to PTO rejections, the Federal Circuit seized
upon the Administrative Procedure Act as further authority for its
question of fact, as had some circuit court decisions prior to the formation of the
Federal Circuit. For a review of early Supreme Court cases on this question, see 2
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.04[3] [a] (2007). See also Koppers Co. v.
Foster Grant Co., 396 F.2d 370, 372 (1st Cir. 1968); Moore v. Shultz, 491 F.2d 294
(10th Cir. 1974).
23 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727,1730 (2007).
24 In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1385
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
25 Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 728 (Fed. Cir. 2002); SIBIA
Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
26 In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d
994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
27 In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
28 In reLee, 277 F.3d at 1344; In re Zurko, 258 F.3d at 1385.
In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d at 1371; In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999.
0 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
3' On remand, the Federal Circuit determined that the Board's conclusions were
not only "clearly erroneous" but also "lack[ed] substantial evidence," and the change
in standard of review therefore did not change the outcome of the case. In re Zurko,
258 F.3d at 1381, 1385.
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requirement that the PTO adequately document the teaching, suggestion
or motivation to select and combine references to render an invention
obvious.2 In requiring the PTO and the courts to document the basis for
a conclusion of obviousness-including a TSM showing-in the
evidentiary record, the Federal Circuit's approach has sometimes seemed
as a practical matter to require documentary evidence of a sort that
• • 33
simply may not exist, even for the most obvious inventions.
Yet in other decisions, the Federal Circuit backed away from such a
rigid requirement. For example, in Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., the Federal
Circuit denied that its prior decisions "provide a rule of law that an
express, written motivation to combine must appear in prior art
references before a finding of obviousness," insisting that "this court has
consistently stated that a court or examiner may find a motivation to
combine prior art references in the nature of the problem to be solved.
This form of motivation to combine evidence is particularly relevant with
simpler mechanical technologies."' 34 The Federal Circuit has sometimes
affirmed rejections for obviousness despite gaps in tracing the chain of
inferences that support an implied "suggestion,"3' acknowledged that the
scientific competence of examiners and administrative patent judges
might equip them to draw informed inferences about motivation to
combine references,36 and recognized that the suggestion or motivation
3 See, e.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d at 1342-44:
The agency tribunal must set forth its findings and the grounds thereof, as
supported by the agency record, and explain its application of the law to the
found facts.... When patentability turns on the question of obviousness, the
search for and analysis of the prior art includes evidence relevant to the
finding of whether there is a teaching, motivation, or suggestion to select
and combine the references relied on as evidence of obviousness.... It must
be based on objective evidence of record ... Deferential judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act does not relieve the agency of its
obligation to develop an evidentiary basis for its findings. To the contrary,
the Administrative Procedure Act reinforces this obligation.
31 See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d
1120, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("This evidence [of TSM] may flow from the prior art
references themselves, the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, or, in some
cases, from the nature of the problem to be solved. However, the suggestion more
often comes from the teachings of the pertinent references. This showing must be
clear and particular, and broad conclusory statements about the teaching of multiple
references, standing alone, are not 'evidence."' (citations omitted)).
Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations
omitted).
35 See, e.g., In re Huston, 308 F.3d 1267, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that the
Board's "conclusions are cryptic, but they are supported by the record.").
See, e.g., In re Berg, 320 F.3d 1310, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("As persons of
scientific competence in the fields in which they work, examiners and administrative
patent judges on the Board are responsible for making findings, informed by their
scientific knowledge, as to the meaning of prior art references to persons of ordinary
skill in the art and the motivation those references would provide to such persons.
Absent legal error or contrary factual evidence, those findings can establish a prima
facie case of obviousness.").
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to combine need not be expressly stated in the prior art, but may come
from reasoning based on established scientific principles or legal
precedent.3 7 But each of these approaches for rejecting a claim requires
"particular findings" grounded in objective evidence, making it more
costly for PTO to reject claims.
The PTO's unhappiness with the Federal Circuit's TSM
jurisprudence is apparent in a brief of the Solicitor General in KSR,
responding to a Supreme Court call for the views of the United States on
certora. 39 In language that appears to have significantlyth e p e titi o n fo r c e t o r r . I a g a e t at a p a s t a v  n f c n l
influenced the Court, the Solicitor General argued that "[t]he Federal
Circuit has transformed one means of establishing obviousness ... -
proof that the prior art provided a teaching, suggestion, or motivation
for combining separate prior art references-into an inflexible
requirement" with the effect of "extend[ing] 'patent protection to non-
innovative combinations of familiar elements." Although KSR presented
an appeal from a court decision in an infringement action rather than an
appeal from a PTO decision, the Solicitor General stressed the burdens
the TSM approach imposes on the PTO:
The Federal Circuit's test not only shunts cases to trial that should
be resolved at summary judgment, but it also unduly restricts the
ability of PTO to reject obvious patent applications. Congress vested
PTO with "primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable
material." That responsibility, which requires technical expertise
drawn from a wide variety of disciplines, places extraordinary
burdens on patent examiners, particularly in light of the high
volume of patent applications. ... Section 103(a) plays a crucial
role in filtering out non-innovative applications and focusing the
examination efforts on substantial claims. ... PTO's obviousness
inquiry should not require an unnecessary search for evidence
showing a particular suggestion, teaching, or motivation to make
insubstantially innovative combinations of elements that are known
in the prior art. PTO should instead be allowed to bring to bear its
full expertise-including its reckoning of the basic knowledge and
common sense possessed by persons in particular fields of
endeavor-when making the predictive judgment whether an
3' See In reFine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In reSernaker, 702 F.2d
989, 994-95 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Eli Lilly & Co., 902 F.2d 943, 945-46 (Fed. Cir.
1990). The case law is summarized for examiners in § 2144 of UNITED STATES PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (2007), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100_2144.htm.
In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Whether the Board relies
on an express or an implicit showing, it must provide particular findings related
thereto. Broad conclusory statements standing alone are not 'evidence.'" (citations
omitted)).
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 546 U.S. 808 (2005).




invention would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in
41the art.
The Federal Circuit noticeably softened its TSM rhetoric while KSR
was pending on appeal. Affirming a rejection for obviousness in In re
42Kahn, the Federal Circuit underscored its deference to the findings of
the PTO, noting that "the Board need only establish motivation to
combine by a preponderance of the evidence to make its primafacie case"
and that "[a]lthough a reasonable person might reach the opposite
conclusion, there is far more than a 'mere scintilla' of evidence present
from which a reasonable mind could find a motivation to combine. 43 In
Alza Corp. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.44 the Federal Circuit touted the
flexibility of its TSM approach and its consistency with Supreme Court
precedent:
[O]ur approach has permitted us to continue to address an issue of
law not readily amenable to bright-line rules, as we recall and are
guided by the wisdom of the Supreme Court in striving for a
"practical test of patentability." ... [U]nder our non-rigid
"motivation-suggestion-teaching" test, a suggestion to combine need
not be found in the prior art.
In Dystar Textilfarben GMBH & Co. v. C.H. Patrick Company,46 the
Federal Circuit complained that critics 47 had quoted its TSM decisions
out of context, reviewed the decisions at length, and concluded:
It is difficult to see how our suggestion test could be seen as rigid
and categorical given the myriad cases over several decades in
which panels of this court have applied the suggestion test flexibly.
... Our suggestion test is in actuality quite flexible and not only
permits, but re~quires, consideration of common knowledge and
common sense.
Empirical investigations of (non)obviousness decisions by different
legal scholars offer mixed reviews of the Federal Circuit's
(non)obviousness jurisprudence on the ground. Glynn Lunney, in a
review of all appellate decisions in patent infringement cases during
"' Id. at 17-18 (citations omitted).
42 441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
42 Id. at 989 (emphasis in original).
4' 464 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1291, 1294.
464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
47 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAw AND POLICY 28 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A
PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21' CENTURY 89 n. 19 (Nat'l Acad. Press 2004), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record id=10976.
48 Dystar, 464 F.3d at 1367 (emphasis in original).
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eight two-year periods between 1944 and 1995, 4 found a sharp and
steady decline in the percentage of patents held invalid, from a high of
63.79% between 1975 and 1976, to a low of 25% in the final period
under study, 1994 to 1995, tending to confirm the Federal Circuit's
reputation as a pro-patent court.50 Lunney found an even more dramatic
decline in the Federal Circuit era in the percentage of decisions in which
invalidity was based on obviousness. During the six two-year periods prior
to the formation of the Federal Circuit, obviousness accounted for a
majority of appellate holdings of patent invalidity, representing between
66.67% and 79.49% of the cases reviewed. After the creation of the
Federal Circuit, this number fell sharply to 50% of the cases between
1984 and 1985, and 20% of the cases between 1994 and 1995. 5' These
numbers suggest that (non)obviousness has played a diminishing role in
appellate judgments in the Federal Circuit era.
John Allison and Mark Lemley examined all reported written
opinions of final decisions on patent validity, whether in district courts or
in the Federal Circuit, during the period 1989-1996.5' They found that
courts upheld validity 54% of the time, and that when patents were held
invalid, obviousness was the reason 42% of the time. Although their data
were broadly consistent with Lunney's, Allison and Lemley did not
examine changes over the course of the time period under study.
Sean McEldowney compared district court decisions on
(non)obviousness before and after the creation of the Federal Circuit
53
and found a significant decline in the likelihood that a patent would be
held invalid if the issue of (non)obviousness was adjudicated, from 55%
in the period 1970-1975 to 31% in the period 1995-2000. 54 McEldowney
found an even more remarkable decline in the number of cases
addressing the (non)obviousness issue, with district courts reaching the
question of obviousness for sixty-four patents in 1970 and only twenty
patents in 2000, although the number of patents issued and infringement
suits filed more than doubled between 1970 and 2000. 55 These results
4" Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 363,
370-75 (2001).
' Id. at 371-72. Earlier studies had also indicated that patents were more likely
to be held valid (or not invalid, in the Federal Circuit's preferred locution) after the
creation of the Federal Circuit than before. Compare GLORIA K. KOENIG, PATENT
INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS § 4.02, 4-19 (rev. ed. 1980)
(indicating that from 1953 to 1978 courts upheld the validity of patents 42% of the
time) with John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q. J. 185, 205 (1998) (finding that from 1989 through
1996 courts upheld the validity of patents 54% of the time).
" Lunney, supra note 49 at 373-75.
52 Allison & Lemley, supra note 50, at 185.
"3 Sean M. McEldowney, New Insights on the "Death" of Obviousness: An Empirical
Study of District Court Obviousness Opinions, 2006 STANFORD TECH. L. REv. 4, 3 (2006).
5 Id. figs. 1-2, 35-36.
55 Id. tbl. 3, 1 37-38.
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support Lunney's conclusion that (non)obviousness has declined in
significance during the Federal Circuit era.
Other empirical scholars have presented different data to defend the
Federal Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence against its critics. Lee
Petherbridge and Polk Wagner, in a study of Federal Circuit analyses of
(non)obviousness between 1990 and 2005, found that the Federal Circuit
affirmed the judgments of lower courts and the PTO on
(non)obviousness approximately 65% of the time, a number that
remained stable over the period under study and is significantly higher
• • 56
than rates of affirmance previously reported for other issues. Moreover,
they found that the Federal Circuit held the invention at issue to be
obvious 57.8% of the time,57 with similar results for mechanical,
chemical, and biotechnology inventions, and that application of the TSM
test had no apparent effect on the likelihood of affirmance and only
modestly increased the likelihood of a conclusion of nonobviousness. 5s
Christopher Cotropia studied final decisions of the Federal Circuit
on patent validity from 2002-2005 to test whether the Federal Circuit has
reduced the standard of nonobviousness through its TSM approach. 59 He
found that the Federal Circuit was more likely to affirm a lower court
finding of obviousness, with an affirmance rate of 62.5%, than a lower
court finding of nonobviousness, for which the affirmance rate was
48.15%, although the difference was not statistically significant.6 He also
found that, ignoring cases in which the Federal Circuit vacated the
judgment below, the percentage of patents that the Federal Circuit held
nonobvious (56.06%) was only slightly higher than the percentage it held
obvious (43.93%). 6' The Federal Circuit affirmed determinations of
obvious 86.79% of the time, calling into question the view that the
Federal Circuit's (non)obviousness jurisprudence has made it difficult to
reject obvious claims. In appeals from district court decisions, the TSM
test prompted a determination of nonobvious, or vacation of a finding of
obvious, for twenty-five patents, compared to fifty-four patents where it
played no role.62 In appeals from the PTO, the TSM test led the Federal
56 Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An
Empirical Analysis of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEXAS L. REv. 2051, 2079 (2007)
(comparing data to results of Chu and Moore). See Christian A. Chu, Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075,
1098 (2001) (finding that the Federal Circuit's reversal rate for claim construction
was approximately 50%); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to
Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARv.J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2001) (finding that Federal Circuit's
reversal rate for claim construction was approximately 33%).
51 Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 56, at 2087.
Id. at 2091-93.
Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical
Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 911 (2007).
Id. at 931-33.
Id. at 934.
6' Id. at 944-45.
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Circuit to rule in favor of the patent applicant in slightly less than 10% of
the cases.63
The divergent conclusions drawn by the authors of these studies are
puzzling, and suggest that the authors' methodologies may involve more
judgment and interpretation than they claim. Evidently, the many
decisions of the Federal Circuit may be aggregated in different ways to
support different claims. The Supreme Court recognized that the Federal
Circuit's (non)obviousness jurisprudence is not uniform in its KSR
opinion, acknowledging that the Federal Circuit may have applied its
TSM test less rigidly in other cases, although noting that the other
decisions "are not now before us and do not correct the errors of law
made by the Court of Appeals in this case."64 Even if not relevant to the
immediate task before the Supreme Court in KSR, the complex
(non)obviousness jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit is surely a topic
worthy of the consideration of legal scholars. Perhaps these varied
decisions cannot be characterized in a meaningful way by coding and
aggregating the cases without examining more closely what they do and
what they say. But before embarking upon that analysis, I first examine
the KSR decision itself more closely.
III. KSR AND THE DISAPPROVAL OF RIGID FORMULAS
Followers of the Federal Circuit's (non)obviousness jurisprudence
are divided on whether the decision of the Supreme Court in KSR is (a) a
radical departure from the Federal Circuit's approach, or (b) unlikely to
65change much. What makes the decision seem radical is that the Court
turned just about every move that the Federal Circuit has made to
standardize and formalize the analysis of (non)obviousness on its head.
What makes it seem unlikely to change much is that, in the end, the
Court left the Federal Circuit with considerable latitude to apply the
(non) obviousness standard as it wishes, so long as it does not do so in a
rigid manner. The Court did not even disapprove of the TSM approach,
so long as it is used flexibly. Moreover, the Court endorsed the Federal
Circuit's characterization of the ultimate determination of
(non) obviousness as a question of law, leaving the Federal Circuit with
considerable room for active appellate review of the issue.
The invention at issue in KSR was an adjustable pedal assembly for
an automobile that could accommodate drivers of different heights. The
claimed assembly incorporated an electronic control sensor mounted on
a support and responsive to a pivot, with the pivot remaining in a
constant position while the pedal could be adjusted forward and
Id. at 946-47.
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1743 (2007).
See Posting of Peter Lattman to Wall Street Journal Law Blog, KSR v. Teleflex:
The Supreme Court's Big Patent Ruling, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/05/01/
ksr-v-teleflex-the-supreme-courts-big-patent-ruling (May 1, 2007, 8:07 EST).
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backward. Finding each of the claim limitations in the prior art, and
concluding that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been
motivated to combine the elements, the trial court awarded summary
judgment of invalidity to KSR. The Federal Circuit reversed, vacated and• • 66
remanded in a nonprecedential opinion, holding that the district court
had failed to make specific enough findings as to the teachinil
suggestion, or motivation to combine the elements of the invention.
KSR appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous opinion.
The Supreme Court largely ignored a quarter century of Federal
Circuit decisions attempting to formalize the (non) obviousness inquiry,
turning instead to its own much earlier decisions that "set forth an
expansive and flexible approach., 68  The Justices reiterated the
continuing vitality of the Supreme Court's ancient skepticism towards
patents that combine elements found in the prior art,69 a skepticism that
stands in contrast to the Federal Circuit's insistence on finding a
teaching, suggestion or motivation to combine elements found in
70different prior art references before declaring a combination obvious.
They repeatedly approved of resort to "common sense" in evaluating an
invention for obviousness,7' in contrast to the Federal Circuit's at least
occasional suspicion of common sense as camouflage for lack of evidence
Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l. Co., 119 Fed. App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). As it does
in all non-precedential opinions, the Federal Circuit recited in all capital letters at the
beginning of the opinion: "This case was not selected for publication in the Federal
Reporter. NOTE: Pursuant to Fed.Cir.R. 47.6, this order is not citable as precedent."
Id.
I67 Id. at 286-88.
KSR Int'l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1739.
Id. at 1739 ("Neither the enactment of § 103 nor the analysis in Graham
disturbed this Court's earlier instructions concerning the need for caution in
granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art.").
70 E.g., In reRouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted):
As this court has stated, 'virtually all [inventions] are combinations of old
elements.' Therefore an examiner may often find every element of a
claimed invention in the prior art. If identification of each claimed element
in the prior art were sufficient to negate patentability, very few patents
would ever issue. Furthermore, rejecting patents solely by finding prior art
corollaries for the claimed elements would permit an examiner to use the
claimed invention itself as a blueprint for piecing together elements in the
prior art to defeat the patentability of the claimed invention. Such an
approach would be 'an illogical and inappropriate process by which to
determine patentability.' To prevent the use of hindsight based on the
invention to defeat patentability of the invention, this court requires the
examiner to show a motivation to combine the references that create the
case of obviousness. In other words, the examiner must show reasons that
the skilled artisan, confronted with the same problems as the inventor and
with no knowledge of the claimed invention, would select the elements from
the cited prior art references for combination in the manner claimed.
71 The Court used the phrase "common sense" five times in its opinion, always
approvingly. KSR Int'l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1741-43.
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and hindsight bias.7 They explicitly told the Federal Circuit that fear of
the hindsight bias is no excuse for "[r]igid preventative rules that deny
",73factfinders recourse to common sense.
The Supreme Court repeatedly invoked "market forces" as tending
to motivate improvements upon the prior art and therefore to make
them obvious. By contrast, when the Federal Circuit takes note of
parallel research efforts by others in the same industry to solve a
problem, it generally counts it as evidence that the invention must have
75been nonobvious. To the Federal Circuit, if market forces make a
solution to a technological problem obviously desirable, yet nobody
figured out how to do it before the patentee, that suggests that the
invention was not obvious. To the Supreme Court, market demand for
the invention makes it likely that the problem will be solved in the
ordinary course of events by persons of ordinary skill with or without the
76
efforts of the patentee.
The Supreme Court disapproved of the Federal Circuit's focus on
the problem that the patentee was trying to solve as the point of
departure for figuring out whether the invention was obvious, preferring
instead an "objective" approach that asks whether the claimed invention
was likely to come about as the obvious solution to any known problem in
light of the prior art.
7
They questioned the Federal Circuit's standard bromide-not even
relevant in the facts of KSR-that an invention may be "obvious to try"
' E.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338,,1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Zurko, 258 F.3d
1379, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
7 KSR Int'l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1742-43.
71 See id. at 1740 ("When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same
field or a different one."); id. at 1740-41 ("Often, it will be necessary for a court to
look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to
the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge
possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine
whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion
claimed by the patent at issue."); id. at 1741 ("In many fields it may be that there is
little discussion of obvious techniques or combinations, and it often may be the case
that market demand, rather than scientific literature, will drive design trends."); id. at
1742 ("When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there
are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has
good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp."); id. at
1744 ("There then existed a marketplace that created a strong incentive to convert
mechanical pedals to electronic pedals, and the prior art taught a number of
methods for achieving this advance.").
'5 See, e.g., Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son Inc., 919 F.2d 720, 725-26 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (the fact that defendant's researchers were pursuing similar research but
did not introduce a similar product until after plaintiffs invention indicates that the
invention was nonobvious rather than obvious).




and still nonobvious.7 8 The "obvious to try" limitation on nonobviousness
analysis comes into play when the prior art leaves substantial uncertainty
as to whether a possible solution to a problem would work, leaving the
inventor to sort through many possibilities without any reasonable
expectation of success. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that
such a solution, although obvious to try, is still nonobvious, and
gratuitously recited this principle in its KSR opinion,8 ° prompting the
Supreme Court to observe that if an invention is obvious to try with an
expectation of success, it is probably obvious.81
Finally, the Supreme Court turned the Federal Circuit's concern
about hindsight on its head. For the Federal Circuit, the hindsight bias is
something that leads to incorrect determinations of obviousness for
inventions that, if properly evaluated as of the time they were made in
light of the prior art alone, would in fact be seen as nonobvious. But the
Supreme Court saw the Federal Circuit as trapped by a different
hindsight bias that cuts the other way. The Supreme Court cautioned
against the use of hindsight to document the inadequacies of the prior
art, suggesting that the avoidance of hindsight does not always favor
patent validity.82 Just as it is improper to use hindsight against the
patentee by using the patentee's combination as a guide to the prior art,
it is improper to use hindsight in favor of the patentee by using the
invention to dismiss the prior art as inadequate. To the Supreme Court,
hindsight bias is not a one-way ratchet.
In sum, the Supreme Court's analysis in KSR suggests sharp
differences with the Federal Circuit on just about every tool that the
Federal Circuit has deployed over the years in its efforts to standardize
and formalize the (non)obviousness inquiry, to guard against the
hindsight bias, and to document the basis for rejections and invalidity
holdings explicitly in the record.
On the other hand, apart from disapproving of rigidity, the KSR
decision does little to constrain the Federal Circuit in its analysis of
(non)obviousness. Consistent with the Federal Circuit's insistence that
the basis for conclusions of obviousness be documented in the record,
the Supreme Court in KSR stated that the analysis should be made
explicit in order to facilitate review. The Supreme Court did not even
prohibit the use of teaching, suggestion or motivation as part of the
(non)obviousness inquiry, so long as it is not done in a rigid manner that
Id. at 1742.
'9 See e.g., In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
'0 Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l. Co., 119 Fed. App'x 282, 289 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
" KSRInt'l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1742.
82 Id. at 1745 ("Teleflex may have made a plausible argument that [the prior art]
Asano [device] is inefficient as compared to Engelgau's preferred embodiment, but
to judge Asano against Engelgau would be to engage in the very hindsight bias
Teleflex rightly urges must be avoided").
Id. at 1741 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
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prevents consideration of "the inferences and creative steps that a person
of ordinary skill in the art would employ.
8 4
Importantly, the Supreme Court adopted the Federal Circuit's
characterization of the ultimate issue of obviousness as a question of
law, 1 subject to plenary review on appeal. In Graham v. John Deere, the
Supreme Court had left this characterization somewhat ambiguous,
stating that "[w] hile the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law
• • • ,,8"6
... the § 103 condition ... lends itself to several basic factual inquiries.
In a short per curiam opinion in Dennison Manufacturing Co. v. Panduit
Corp., the Court revisited this language, vacating and remanding a
decision by the Federal Circuit that had overturned a trial court finding
of invalidity for obviousness without holding that the trial court's findings
were clearly erroneous as required by Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of
817Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court lamented that "we lack the benefit
of the Federal Circuit's informed opinion on the complex issue of the
degree to which the obviousness determination is one of fact," suggesting
that it regarded the issue as unresolved."" On remand, the Federal Circuit
stated its view that the conclusion as to obviousness is one of law based on
subsidiary fact-findings.8 9
In KSR, the Court cited its own decision in Graham for the
proposition that the ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal
determination, without noting any prior ambiguity.90 Given the
procedural posture of the KSR case, in which the Federal Circuit had
reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment of invalidity, the
Court had to conclude that (non)obviousness is a question of law in
order to reach the merits itself and reinstate summaryjudgment for the
defendant. 91 If the ultimate judgment was a question of fact, it would
have been difficult, in the face of conflicting expert testimony, to
maintain that there was no genuine issue of material fact for trial. In
order to reverse the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court thus had to
characterize the ultimate issue as a question of law.
But if the ultimate determination of (non)obviousness is a question
of law, for all practical purposes the issue will continue to belong to the
Federal Circuit. In theory, of course, the legal rulings of the Federal
84 Id.
'5 Id. at 1745.
383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
87 475 U.S. 809 (1986).
Id. at 811.
Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The
Federal Circuit noted that Graham v. John Deere has been widely interpreted as holding
that the conclusion as to obviousness is a question of law, "because the validity issue
in Graham turned on that answer and because of what the Court did in Graham. It
disagreed with conclusions reached below, did not remand, described no finding as
'clearly erroneous,' and did not mention Rule 52(a)." Id. at 1567.
KSR Int'l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1745 (2007).
Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l. Co., 119 Fed. App'x 282, 290 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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Circuit are subject to review by the Supreme Court, and the Supreme
Court can review as many decisions of the Federal Circuit as it feels
necessary in order to ensure that (non) obviousness doctrine remains
"expansive and flexible. 92 But whether they are characterized as
questions of law or questions of fact, determinations of (non)obviousness
will remain difficult and technical. It is hard to imagine the Supreme
Court reviewing these determinations on more than a sporadic basis. So
long as the Federal Circuit shows a modicum of respect for the Supreme
Court's teachings,93 it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will seek
out opportunities to revisit the issue. It is easier to observe how the
Federal Circuit writes its opinions than it is to monitor how it actually
decides cases.
I return to the jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit to examine more
closely what it says and does in evaluating the (non)obviousness of
chemical and pharmaceutical inventions.
IV. CHEMICAL OBVIOUSNESS: FROM FLEXIBILITY TO RIGID
FORMALISM, WITH LIBERAL CONSIDERATION OF POST-INVENTION
EVIDENCE
Although in principle the (non)obviousness standard is the same
across all fields of technology, many lower court decisions have
elaborated special rules for evaluating the (non) obviousness of
"chemical" inventions. Most Supreme Court decisions considering the
(non)obviousness requirement (or its pre-1952 antecedent, the
"invention" requirement) have involved relatively simple mechanical
inventions that the Court deemed unpatentable. Perhaps this reflects a
selection bias in granting certiorari in favor of cases about technology
that the Justices can understand. A rare Supreme Court case upholding
the (non)obviousness of an invention was United States v. Adams, a case
involving a battery that made use of a chemical reaction.94 Although it did
not articulate a different standard for evaluating chemical inventions, in
concluding that the invention was (non)obvious and patentable the
Court noted the unpredictability of the results of the chemical reaction,
even though it combined old elements that were each separately
disclosed in the prior art.95
9' KSR Int'l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1739.
9' The Federal Circuit may be off to a poor start in showing its respect for KSR In
three post-KSR (non)obviousness cases the Federal Circuit has not even cited KSR
Forest Labs., Inc. v. Ivax Pharm., Inc., 501 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Daiichi Sankyo,
Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Frazier v. Layne Christensen Co.,
239 Fed. App'x 604 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
" United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
'5 Id. at 51-52. But cf. Mandel Bros, Inc. v. Wallace, 335 U.S. 291 (1948) (holding
invalid a patent on an improved antiperspirant that used urea to neutralize acidity on
ground that results would have been predictable to chemists).
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A long line of cases from the Federal Circuit and the CCPA have
developed a distinct approach to evaluating the (non)obviousness of
chemical inventions. One notable feature of these cases is their embrace
of a hindsight perspective. In contrast to the concern behind the TSM
test-that inventions will appear more obvious in hindsight than they in
fact would have been at the time they were made-a recurring concern
in chemical cases is that inventions that appeared obvious ex ante can be
more accurately seen in hindsight to have surprising and nonobvious
features that make them worthy of patent protection. In a series of
decisions, the CCPA called the PTO to task for failing to consider such
post-invention evidence and for focusing too rigidly on the ex ante
obviousness of chemical structure in evaluating the patentability of new
chemicals.
Consideration of post-invention evidence responds to the realities of
research in the chemical arts. Many new chemicals are created by making
small changes in prior art molecules. These changes may be conventional
in nature, readily contemplated and executed by chemists of ordinary
skill. Nonetheless, an obvious variation on a previously known chemical
may have surprising properties. Some properties of new chemicals are
either predictable or immediately apparent upon synthesis. But often it
takes time to determine the properties of a new chemical through testing
and observation that cannot take place until after the chemical is in
hand. To the extent that (non)obviousness resides in differences in
properties between a new chemical and structurally similar chemicals in
the prior art, the evaluation must await observation of these properties.
Consider the important opinion of Judge Rich for the CCPA in In re
96Papesch. The patent applicant claimed novel triethyl compounds that
were structurally similar to trimethyl compounds in the prior art, but
comparative tests performed on the new and old chemicals showed that
the claimed compounds were active anti-inflammatory agents while the
prior art compounds lacked this property. The examiner rejected the
claims on the ground that the new molecules differed from the prior art
only by substituting "obvious homologs of the methyl groups shown in
identical positions in the reference compound and the method of
preparation is substantially the same."9 ' The examiner found the
difference in properties "interesting but irrelevant" to the compound
claims, noting that "if an invention is present, it resides in the use of the
claimed compounds as anti-inflammatory agents and should be claimed
as such."98 The Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed, noting that,
given the obviousness "to the chemist" of the claimed compounds in light
of the prior art, the showing of new pharmacological properties was akin
to "secondary evidence" of (non)obviousness that might be useful in case
6 315 F.2d 381 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
9' Id. at 382.
98 Id. at 383-84 (quoting from examiner's final rejection).
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of doubt, but was insufficient to override the clear showing of
obviousness in this case based on chemical structure.9
Judge Rich reversed in an opinion that preferred actual hindsight
evidence of nonobviousness over ex ante speculation:
If that which appears, at first blush, to be obvious though new is
shown by evidence not to be obvious, then the evidence prevails
over surmise or unsupported contention and a rejection based on
obviousness must fall.
The "evidence" that could show that a new chemical that appears "at
first blush" to be obvious is in fact nonobvious was evidence of
"unexpected advantageous properties"-anti-inflammatory activity in the
case of the molecules claimed by Papesch. Judge Rich did not purport to
announce a new principle, but summed up a review of prior cases as
follows:
Where what we may call the apparent obviousness of the compound
(including its properties) was overcome by evidence of unexpected
advantageous properties the claim to it was held patentable; but
where no such properties were shown to exist it remained an
obvious compound with obvious properties. 1 '
The reasoning behind the prior decisions varied, with some cases
resting on the lack of suggestion or motivation to make the claimed
compounds given the failure of the prior art to predict their unexpected
properties. °2 ButJudge Rich did not so characterize the case before him,
perhaps because other useful properties of the prior art compounds
would have been sufficient to motivate the creation of homologs. Instead,
he treated the surprising anti-inflammatory properties as new evidence
revealing the claimed compounds to be less similar to the prior art
compounds than one might have expected ex ante. Judge Rich declined
to distinguish between the obviousness of the compounds themselves and
the nonobviousness of their properties, famously observing:
From the standpoint of patent law, a compound and all of its
properties are inseparable; they are one and the same thing. The
graphic formulae, the chemical nomenclature, the systems of
classification and study such as the concepts of homology,
isomerism, etc., are mere symbols by which compounds can be
identified, classified, and compared. But a formula is not a
compound and while it may serve in a claim to identify what is being
patented, as the metes and bounds of a deed identify a plot of land,
the thing that is patented is not the formula but the compound
identified by it. And the patentability of the thing does not depend
on the similarity of its formula to that of another compound but of
Id. at 385-86 (quoting from board opinion).
100 Id. at 386-87 (emphasis in original)
Id. at 389.
102 Id. at 389-90 (discussing In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955 (C.C.P.A. 1961) and In re
Larsen, 292 F.2d 531 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
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the similarity of the former compound to the latter. There is no
basis in law for ignoring any property in making such a comparison.
An assumed similarity based on a comparison of formulae must give
way to evidence that the assumption is erroneous.103
Judge Rich commended the Board for ignoring the examiner's
argument that, if it is the properties rather than the structure of the
claimed compound that are nonobvious, the applicant should be limited
to claiming a process utilizing the newly discovered property rather than
getting a product claim to the compound itself.°4 He dismissed the
argument that the claimed and prior art compounds, given their
structural similarity, presumably have many properties in common,
noting: "Presumably they do, but presumption is all we have here." °5 He
noted pragmatically that "product claims .... have well-recognized
advantages to those in the business of making and selling compounds, in
contrast to process-of-use claims, because competitors in the sale of
compounds are not generally users., 116 He thus rejected the rigid
approach of the PTO with its focus on chemical formulae in favor of
pragmatic flexibility, including unabashed reliance on hindsight
evaluation of evidence that was not available at the time the invention
was made, in order to give business firms the patent claims they needed
to develop molecules with new uses.
The Federal Circuit revisited some of the same issues in its 1990 en
banc decision in In re Dillon.°7 The In re Dillon opinion, although
consistent with In re Papesch, reveals greater concern with clarifying and
formalizing the correct analytical approach to (non)obviousness
determinations, with specifying formal burdens of proof and the kind of
evidence that will meet those burdens, and with maintaining the
distinction between product and process claims that Judge Rich
preferred to gloss over in In re Papesch.
The inventor in In re Dillon discovered that tetra-orthoester
compounds, when added to hydrobcarbon fuels, will reduce emissions of
soot during combustion of the fuel. She claimed a composition of
hydrocarbon fuel plus enough tetra-orthoester "to reduce the particulate
emissions from the combustion of the hydrocarbon fuel.' 0 8 The prior art
included tetra-orthoester compounds, but did not disclose their
combination with hydrocarbon fuel, nor did it suggest their use to
reduce particulate emissions from fuel combustion. The prior art did,
however, describe compositions that combined hydrocarbon fuels with
structurally similar tri-orthoesters for the different purpose of
'03 Id. at 391 (emphasis in original).
104 Id.
'0' Id. (emphasis in original).
106 Id.
'07 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
'08 Id. at 690 (reciting Claim 2).
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"dewatering" the fuels.' °9 The Board affirmed rejection of the claims for
obviousness, noting that there was a reasonable expectation that the tri-
and tetra-orthoester fuel compositions would have similar properties
given their structural similarities. In the Board's view, this made the tetra-
orthoester fuel compositions prima facie obvious, shifting the burden to
the applicant to show unexpected or surprisingly advantageous
properties for the claimed compositions that the prior art did not
share.1"" Dillon failed to make this showing, and in fact showed quite the
opposite. Her original patent application claimed tri-orthoester fuel
compositions as well as tetra-orthoester fuel compositions, and included
data showing equivalent activity for both compositions in reducing
particulate emissions."
But Dillon's own patent application was not in the prior art, and
Dillon argued that her own disclosure should not be used against her to
show that her invention was obvious. The Federal Circuit, evidently
troubled by this argument, did not rest on the comparative data from her
specification in its analysis."' The Federal Circuit panel that first
considered Dillon's appeal reversed the PTO, holding that "when the
claimed subject matter is a new chemical compound or composition, a
prima facie case of obviousness is not deemed made unless both (1) the
new compound or composition is structurally similar to the reference
compound or composition and (2) there is some suggestion or
expectation in the prior art that the new compound or composition will
have the same or a similar utility as that discovered by the applicant."".
Rehearing the case en banc, the Federal Circuit withdrew the panel
opinion and affirmed the rejection. Because Dillon had not chosen to
argue the patentability of her process claims separately, the Federal
Circuit only considered the composition claims. Judge Lourie's opinion
for the en banc majority nonetheless suggested that this distinction
mattered, in striking contrast to Judge Rich's comment in Papesch that
the Board correctly ignored the distinction.' 4 Responding to Dillon's
argument that none of the prior art references disclosed or suggested
her new use for the compositions, Judge Lourie noted that "the
composition claims are not limited to this new use; i.e., they are not
1' Id. at 691.
110 Id.
111 Id.
"' Id. at 694:
While we caution against such a practice, it is clear to us that references by
the PTO to the comparative data in the patent application were not
employed as evidence of equivalence between the tri- and tetra-orthoesters;
the PTO was simply pointing out that the applicant did not or apparently
could not make a showing of superiority for the claimed tetra-ester
compositions over the prior art tri-ester compositions.
.. In re Dillon, 892 F.2d 1554, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1989), opinion withdrawn by
rehearing en banc, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
114 In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
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physically or structurally distinguishable over the prior art compositions
except with respect to the orthoester component. 1 1 5 Focusing upon the
compositions themselves, Judge Lourie found the prior art sufficiently
close to make them prima facie obvious:
We believe that the PTO has established, through its combination
of references, that there is a sufficiently close relationship between
the tri-orthoesters and tetra-orthoesters ... in the fuel oil art to
create an expectation that hydrocarbon fuel compositions
containing the tetra-esters would have similar properties, including
water scavenging, to like compositions containing the tri-esters, and
to provide the motivation to make such new compositions."
6
The PTO, having shown both structural similarity between the
claimed and prior art compositions and motivation in the prior art to
make the claimed compositions, established a prima facie case of
obviousness, shifting the burden to the applicant to rebut that prima
facie case with further evidence:
Such rebuttal or argument can consist of a comparison of test data
showing that the claimed compositions possess unexpectedly
improved properties or properties that the prior art does not have,
that the prior art is so deficient that there is no motivation to make
what might otherwise appear to be obvious changes, or any other
argument or presentation of evidence that is pertinent. There is no
question that all evidence of the properties of the claimed
compositions and the prior art must be considered in determining
the ultimate question of patentability, but it is also clear that the
discovery that a claimed composition possesses a property not
disclosed for the prior art subject matter, does not by itself defeat a
prima facie case."
A comparison of the Federal Circuit's opinion in In re Dillon with the
CCPA's opinion in In re Papesch reveals on the part of the Federal Circuit
a greater inclination towards formalism, more careful attention to the
mechanics of proof, and a sharper focus on the differences between the
invention as claimed and the prior art, as well as renewed attention to the
difference between product and process claims. It does not, however,
. In reDillon, 919 F.2d at 692.
116 Id.
"' Id. at 692-93 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The en banc majority
was unmoved by the argument that the prior art references did not make the
invention obvious because they did not relate to the problem Dillon confronted,
noting that the composition claims were not limited to such a use, but left open the
possibility that Dillon might be entitled to process claims that focused more narrowly
on the problem of reducing particulate emissions. Id. at 695 ("We make no judgment
as to the patentability of claims that Dillon might have made and properly argued to a
method directed to the novel aspects of her invention, except to question the lack of
logic in a claim to a method of reducing particulate emissions by combusting."). For
an interesting analysis of In re Dillon as a rare example of the use of the doctrine of
inherency in nonobviousness analysis, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency,
47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 371, 395-400 (2005).
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reveal either a greater bias toward patent validity or a greater concern
with avoiding hindsight evaluations. Both courts invite consideration of
post-invention evidence to compare the properties of the invention with
those of the prior art. Although the Federal Circuit was careful not to rely
on Dillon's own disclosure to show that the undisclosed properties of the
prior art were the same as the properties of the claimed invention, it was
willing to place the burden of proof on Dillon to show that they were
different. Because Dillon had failed to rebut the PTO's prima facie case
of obviousness, she was unable to obtain a patent, even though the prior
art did not disclose the properties that she demonstrated for the claimed
invention.
Concern about the hindsight bias features more prominently in
cases admonishing the PTO and district courts that an invention that is
"obvious to try" may nonetheless be nonobvious if the prior art does not
establish a reasonable expectation of success."" Although the principle
that "obvious to try" is not enough to defeat patentability is not limited to
chemical obviousness, it has been particularly important in sustaining the
patentability of chemical and biotechnology inventions.
The Federal Circuit elaborated upon the distinction between what is
obvious and what is merely obvious to try in In re O'Farrell:
The admonition that "obvious to try" is not the standard under
§ 103 has been directed mainly at two kinds of error. In some cases,
what would have been "obvious to try" would have been to vary all
parameters or try each of numerous possible choices until one
possibly arrived at a successful result, where the prior art gave either
no indication of which parameters were critical or no direction as
to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful. In
others, what was "obvious to try" was to explore a new technology or
general approach that seemed to be a promising field of
experimentation, where the prior art gave only general guidance as
to the particular form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it.
Obviousness does not require absolute predictability of success.
Indeed, for many inventions that seem quite obvious, there is no
absolute predictability of success until the invention is reduced to
practice. There is always at least a possibility of unexpected results,
that would then provide an objective basis for showing that the
invention, although apparently obvious, was in law nonobvious."'
... See, e.g., In re Tomlinson, 363 F.2d 928, 931 (C.C.P.A. 1966) ("Slight reflection
suggests, we think, that there is usually an element of 'obviousness to try' in any
research endeavor, that it is not undertaken with complete blindness but rather with
some semblance of a chance of success, and that patentability determinations based
on that as the test would not only be contrary to statute but result in a marked
deterioration of the entire patent system as an incentive to invest in those efforts and
attempts which go by the name of 'research.'").
"' In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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In O'Farrell, where the prior art included an article by the inventors
explicitly suggesting the invention and predicting success more than a
year prior to their own patent filing date, the court concluded that the
prior art did more than make the invention obvious to try."" But in other
early biotechnology cases, the court was skeptical about whether there
would have been a reasonable expectation of success when the prior art
made inventions obvious to try.
In Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.,121 the Federal Circuit
reversed a judgment holding invalid a patent on an immunometric
"sandwich assay" 1 2 for detecting the presence of an antigen in fluid
samples using monoclonal antibodies. The prior art disclosed similar
sandwich assays using conventional polyclonal antibodies, as well as
techniques for producing monoclonal antibodies. The Federal Circuit
concluded that the prior art references were no more than "invitations to
try monoclonal antibodies in immunoassays" that "do not suggest how
that end might be accomplished. 123 In In re Vaeck the Federal Circuit
reversed a rejection of claims to a chimeric gene capable of being
expressed in cyanobacteria (blue-green algae) that linked a gene for an
insecticidal protein from Bacillus bacteria with a promoter region
effective to cause expression in a cyanobacteria host. The prior art
disclosed the expression of chimeric genes in cyanobacteria hosts, genes
encoding insecticidal proteins expressed in Bacillus, and the advantages
of expressing genes in recombinant hosts in order to obtain larger
quantities of the gene product. The PTO concluded that this made the
invention prima facie obvious, but the Federal Circuit reversed, asserting
that "[t] he prior art simply does not disclose or suggest the expression in
cyanobacteria of a chimeric gene encoding an insecticidally active
protein, or convey to those of ordinary skill a reasonable expectation of
success in doing so. '" 5
In each of these cases, the Federal Circuit asks whether the prior art
provided both motivation to make the invention and a reasonable
expectation of success. In new fields, such as biotechnology in the 1980s,
many approaches that are obvious to try are nonetheless fraught with
uncertainty. As a field progresses, however, uncertainty decreases, at least
with respect to the likely results of standard experimental designs and
approaches. A (non)obviousness inquiry that focuses on reasonable
expectation of success should adapt to the changing expectations of
those working in a field as further knowledge reduces uncertainty,
0 Id. at 904.
12' Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
i2 A sandwich assay uses two different antibodies that bind to two different sites
on an antigen to create a sandwich with antibodies on the outside and antigen in the
middle.
23 Hybritech Inc., 802 F.2d at 1380.
12 In reVaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
2 Id. at 493.
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although it may be necessary to consult expert testimony to determine
where those expectations stood at the time the invention was made.
The Federal Circuit lost sight of this guiding principle in two cases
involving the patenting of DNA sequences corresponding to known
proteins. 6 Because the Federal Circuit's analysis of these cases is
particularly problematic under KSR, I review them in some detail. In the
early years of the biotechnology industry, isolating a DNA sequence that
encodes a known protein was a significant technological challenge,
beyond the reasonable expectations of success of a PHOSITA. But over
time, this became a routine step using familiar techniques that scientists
of ordinary skill would deploy with a reasonable expectation of success.12
The PTO accordingly began rejecting patent claims covering DNA
sequences encoding known proteins,12 9 and the applicants appealed the
rejections. The Federal Circuit, rather than asking whether the prior art
provided a motivation to isolate the gene and the tools to do this work
with a reasonable expectation of success, turned instead to the first
approximation of chemical obviousness that Judge Rich had rejected as
unduly simplistic in In re Papesch, beginning and ending the analysis by
asking whether the prior art made the structure of the DNA molecule
obvious.
In In re Bell the applicant claimed DNA and RNA molecules
encoding human insulin-like growth factors.1 30 The prior art disclosed
amino acid sequences for human insulin-like growth factors and general
techniques for cloning genes encoding proteins for which a partial
amino acid sequence is known. The examiner rejected the claims as
prima facie obvious and the Board affirmed, reasoning that "although a
protein and its DNA are not structurally similar, they are correspondently
126 In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1995). For a somewhat different critique that situates these decisions in the Federal
Circuit's approach to a variety of doctrinal issues arising in biotechnology cases, see
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle, 54 CAsE W. RES. L.
REv. 691, 700-02 (2004).
127 See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1207-08 (Fed. Cir.
1991) ("The district court specifically found that, as of 1983, none of the prior art
references 'suggest[s] that the probing strategy of using two fully-redundant [sic] sets
of probes, of relatively high degeneracy [sic], to screen a human genomic library
would be likely to succeed in pulling out the gene of interest.' . . . While it found that
defendants had shown that these procedures were "obvious to try," the references did
not show that there was a reasonable expectation of success."). Although the Federal
Circuit in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. followed the lead of the district
court and the parties in analyzing the obviousness of the gene by considering the
obviousness of the method used to isolate the gene, the court noted in a footnote
that the patent claimed products, not processes, and that it was not independently
considering whether the products would have been obvious "aside from the alleged
obviousness of a method of making them." Id. at 1207 n.3.
12 Kate H. Murashige, Section 102/103 Issues in Biotechnology Patent Prosecution, 16
AIPLA Q.J. 294, 297-98 (1989).
" Id. at 297.
120 991 F.2d 781, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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linked via the genetic code," and concluded that there was no evidence
"that one skilled in the art, knowing the amino acid sequences of the
desired proteins, would not have been able to predictably clone the
desired DNA sequences without undue experimentation. , 3' The Federal
Circuit reversed in an opinion by Judge Lourie. The opinion began by
rejecting the proposition "that the 'correspondent link' between a gene
and its encoded protein via the genetic code renders the gene obvious
when the amino acid sequence is known.' ',3 The court noted that
because of the degeneracy of the genetic code-i.e., because there are
multiple DNA sequences that could encode the same amino acid
sequence-the amino acid sequence for insulin-like growth factor could
be encoded by more than 1036 DNA sequences, and nothing in the prior
art suggested which of these possibilities was the actual human DNA
sequence identified and claimed by Bell. The PTO had therefore failed
to establish a prima facie case of obviousness.
133
This rigid analysis entirely bypasses the perspective of a PHOSITA on
the obviousness of a gene corresponding to a known amino acid
sequence. With knowledge of even a partial amino acid sequence and
standard cloning techniques, a geneticist would have constructed
nucleotide probes to find a corresponding cDNA molecule in a cDNA
library, with a great expectation of success. The court did not entirely
dismiss the relevance of known cloning methods to the obviousness of
the gene. Instead, it pointed out that the primary reference cited by the
examiner for disclosure of cloning methods in fact "taught away" from
the claimed invention because it called for an approach that would not
have worked for cloning the gene for insulin-like growth factor.3 4 This
explicit consideration of cloning methods in the opinion left open the
possibility that the court might, in a future case, find a DNA sequence
claim obvious as more sophisticated cloning techniques became routine
in the art, giving rise to a clearer expectation of success.
This possibility was foreclosed two years later when the Federal
' 7 35
Circuit decided In re Deue. Like In re Bell, that case involved claims to
DNA sequences encoding known proteins. The proteins in the Deuel case
were heparin-binding growth factors (HBGFs) that stimulate cell division
and tissue repair. Deuel isolated and purified HBGFs from bovine
uterine tissue, determined a partial amino acid sequence, and used this
information to isolate both bovine and human DNA sequences encoding
HBGFs. From these DNA sequences, Deuel determined the
Id. at 783.
I3 ld. at 783-84.
The result might be different, the court observed in dicta, "in a case in which
a known amino acid sequence is specified exclusively by unique codons." Id. at 784
' The probes used by Bell to clone the gene were longer than those
recommended in the reference and, contrary to the suggested approach in the
reference, included no amino acids that were specified by unique codons. Id. at 784.
115 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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corresponding amino acid sequences using the genetic code. The patent
application disclosed the native bovine and human HBGF DNA
sequences and amino acid sequences that Deuel found, and included
both claims that were limited to these particular DNA sequences (claims
5 and 7) and broader claims to all DNA sequences encoding HBGFs with
the same amino acid sequences (claims 4 and 6). The examiner found
both sets of claims obvious under section 103 based on two references,
Bohlen and Maniatis. Bohlen disclosed partial amino acid sequences for
human and bovine proteins identified as heparin-binding brain mitogens
(HBBMs), useful in repair of neural tissue, that were identical to the
sequence of HBGFs.136 Maniatis disclosed methods of isolating DNA
molecules encoding proteins based on knowledge of partial amino acid
sequences for the proteins. The Board affirmed the rejection, reasoning
that with knowledge of Bohlen's partial amino acid sequence, a
PHOSITA would have been motivated to clone the corresponding gene
in order to produce larger quantities of a protein with useful mitogenic
properties, and the Maniatis reference would have taught how to make
the gene with a reasonable expectation of success. On appeal, Deuel
argued that the PTO erred in finding prima facie obviousness despite the
lack of structurally similar molecules in the prior art, and improperly
rejected the claims based on the obviousness of a method of making the
molecules. The Federal Circuit agreed, again in an opinion by Judge
Lourie, following the same structural analysis deployed in In re Bell. As in
In re Bell, the Federal Circuit in In re Deuel quibbled with the Board's
137
analysis of the obviousness of a method of cloning the gene, but
ultimately concluded that "the existence of a general method of isolating
cDNA or DNA molecules is essentially irrelevant to the question whether
the specific molecules themselves would have been obvious, in the
absence of other prior art that suggests the claimed DNAs."1
8
Focusing on the proof structure for chemical obviousness that it had
affirmed in In re Dillon, the Federal Circuit held that the examiner bore
the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of obviousness. The
court noted that "[n]ormally a prima facie case of obviousness is based
upon structural similarity, i.e., an established structural relationship
between a prior art compound and the claimed compound," and that
such a relationship "may provide the requisite motivation ... to obtain
"6 The Federal Circuit notes that both the examiner and the Board "asserted,
without explanation, that HBBMs are the same as HBGFs and that the genes
encoding these proteins are identical." Id. at 1557.
117 Id. at 1556 ("No prior art was cited to support the proposition that it would
have been obvious to screen human placental and bovine uterine cDNA libraries for
the claimed cDNA clones. Presumably, the examiner was relying on Bohlen's
suggestion that HBBMs may be homologous between species, although the examiner
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new compounds., 139 In this case, "the prior art does not disclose any
relevant cDNA molecules, let alone close relatives of the specific,
structurally-defined cDNA molecules of claims 5 and 7 that might render
them obvious."' 4 These molecules would not have been obvious from
Bohlen's disclosure "because Bohlen teaches proteins, not the claimed or
closely related cDNA molecules" and, echoing In re Bell, "[t]he
redundancy of the genetic code precluded contemplation of or focus on
the specific cDNA molecules of claims 5 and 7."41
Had it not been rigidly focused on structural similarity as the sine
qua non of chemical obviousness, at this point, the court might have
considered whether anything in the prior art other than a structurally
similar DNA molecule would have motivated a PHOSITA to make the
claimed invention with a reasonable expectation of success. Such an
analysis would have led the court, as it did the Board, to the conclusion
that in this particular field knowledge of a useful protein would motivate
a PHOSITA to clone the corresponding gene, just as in the chemical
field knowledge of a useful molecule would motivate a PHOSITA to
construct homologs, analogs, or isomers. Instead, in an analysis that
conflates prima facie obviousness with conception of an invention, the
court concluded that the claimed DNA sequences could not be obvious
until they were actually isolated and purified:
[O] ne could not have conceived the subject matter of claims 5 and
7 based on the teachings in the cited prior art because, until the
claimed molecules were actually isolated and purified, it would have
been highly unlikely for one of ordinary skill in the art to
contemplate what was ultimately obtained. What cannot be
contemplated or conceived cannot be obvious.
The court faulted the Board's theory that a PHOSITA would have
been motivated to clone the gene by knowledge of a useful protein and
cloning techniques on the ground that it "amounts to speculation and an
impermissible hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention. 43
Ignoring the PTO's determination of a reasonable likelihood of success,
the court observed,
Thus, even if, as the examiner stated, the existence of general
cloning techniques, coupled with knowledge of a protein's
structure, might have provided motivation to prepare a cDNA or
made it obvious to prepare a cDNA, that does not necessarily make
obvious a particular claimed cDNA. "Obvious to try" has long been
held not to constitute obviousness.
144





14 Id. at 1559 (emphasis in original).
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Given the Board's conclusion-never explicitly disputed by the
Federal Circuit-that the prior art would have given a PHOSITA a
reasonable expectation of success in cloning the gene, 145 the observation
that obviousness requires something more than "obvious to try" is beside
the point. For the same reason, the court misses its mark with the
criticism that "[t]he PTO's focus on known methods for potentially
isolating the claimed DNA molecules is also misplaced because the claims
at issue define compounds, not methods. 1 46 Such cloning methods are
relevant to the obviousness of the compounds because they provide a
reasonable expectation of success in making the claimed compounds.
This expectation of success, in combination with the motivation to clone
the gene arising from knowledge that it encodes a useful protein, puts
the claimed sequences within easy reach of a PHOSITA. By analogy to
prior cases, such a showing should shift the burden to the applicant to
explain why the invention is nonetheless nonobvious. But by putting the
burden on the examiner to show that the prior art would allow a
PHOSITA to envision the structure of a DNA sequence before holding
the sequence even prima facie obvious, the court forecloses this analysis.
Judge Rich's 1963 opinion in In re Papesch admonished the PTO to
look beyond structure in analyzing the obviousness of a new chemical,
directing attention to what the chemical does rather than simply what it
looks like.' 47 Thirty-two years later, Judge Lourie's 1995 opinion in In re
Deuel reinstates structural similarity as the keystone of chemical
obviousness analysis, preempting further analysis of obviousness for
chemicals if the prior art does not permit visualization of their
structures.
148
This analysis seems highly vulnerable to reversal if a similar case were
to find its way to the Supreme Court today. It imposes a "rigid and
mandatory formula" in lieu of the Supreme Court's preferred "expansive
and flexible approach," thereby limiting the (non)obviousness inquiry. It
also defies common sense and ignores the problem-solving approach of
PHOSITAs in this particular field, with the effect of "[g]ranting patent
protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary course without
real innovation.'
49
A recent decision of the PTO Board of Appeals suggests that KSR has
emboldened the PTO to resume rejections of patent claims to DNA
sequences encoding known proteins.15 0 The claimed invention in that
145 Id. at 1557 ("The Board concluded that 'the Bohlen reference would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in this art that they should make the gene, and
the Maniatis reference would have taught a technique for 'making' the gene with a
reasonable expectation of success.'").
416 Id. at 1559.
14 315 F.2d 381 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
148 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
14' KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007).
l ExparteKubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1410 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 2007).
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case was an isolated polynucleotide molecule encoding "NAIL"
polypeptides that mediate immune responses.) The prior art disclosed
an identical polypeptide known as p38 , as well as conventional methods
of determining both the corresponding amino acid sequence and
nucleotide sequence. The Board found that a PHOSITA would have had
a reasonable expectation of success in obtaining the NAIL cDNA based
on the prior art and therefore affirmed the examiner's rejection on
grounds of obviousness. The patent applicant argued that, under In re
Deuel, it was improper to reject a claim drawn to a specific polynucleotide
molecule without any prior art showing or suggesting a structurally
similar molecule. The Board initially distinguished In reDeuel,152 and then
went on to call into question its continued viability after KSR given the
Supreme Court's remarks about how an invention that is "obvious to try"
may well be obvious:
The "problem" facing those in the art was to isolate NAIL cDNA,
and there were a limited number of methodologies available to do
so. The skilled artisan would have had reason to try these
methodologies with the reasonable expectation that at least one
would be successful. Thus, isolating NAIL cDNA was "the. product
not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense," leading
us to conclude NAIL cDNA is not patentable as it would have been
obvious to isolate it.1
3
Although this bold and explicit departure from In re Deuel may
prompt an appeal to the Federal Circuit, the Board's decision seems well-
founded under KSR
Another line of cases from the Federal Circuit on chemical
obviousness, beginning with the 1985 opinion of Judge Rich in In re
Durden,154 has provoked notable controversy over the relative virtues of
flexibility and rigidity. In In re Durden the Federal Circuit affirmed
rejection of a claim to a method of preparing novel and nonobvious end
products using novel and nonobvious starting materials. The examiner
had allowed claims to both the starting materials and end products, but
rejected the method claims on the ground that the same process had
been disclosed in the prior art using similar starting materials. The Board
affirmed the rejection by a split vote. On appeal to the Federal Circuit,
the applicant fatally conceded "that the claimed process, apart from the
fact of employing a novel and unobvious starting material and apart from
the fact of producing a new and unobvious product, is obvious, ", 55 and
did not argue that differences in either the starting materials or the end
product "would be expected to affect the reaction in any way which
' Id. "NAIL" is an acronym for Natural Killer Cell Activation Inducing Ligand.
15 Id. at 1413.
'53 Id. at 1414 (quoting KSR).
1 763 F.2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
'5- Id. at 1408.
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might render the claimed process unobvious.' 56 Instead, the applicant
frankly sought a bright-line rule that an otherwise obvious process should
be patentable simply because the starting material and end product are
novel and nonobvious"17 Affirming the rejection, the Federal Circuit
declined to adopt such a bright-line rule of patentability, insisting upon a
flexible, case-by-case approach:
We are sure that there are those who would like to have us state
some clear general rule by which all cases of this nature could be
decided. Some judges might be tempted to try it. But the question
of obviousness under § 103 arises in such an unpredictable variety
of ways and in such different forms that it would be an indiscreet
thing to do. Today's rule would likely be regretted in tomorrow's
case. Our function is to apply, in each case, § 103 as written to the
facts of disputed issues, not to generalize or make rules for other
cases which are unforeseeable.
This decision was much criticized by the patent bar19 and,
notwithstanding Judge Rich's insistence that the case should not be read
to lay down a clear general rule, the PTO interpreted In re Durden broadly
to impose a virtual per se rule of obviousness for claims to otherwise
conventional processes using new and nonobvious starting materials to
make new and nonobvious end products.16 This result was particularly
troubling to the biotechnology industry, which was trying to make a
business out of using conventional production techniques to harvest
recombinant proteins from genetically engineered host cells.
Biotechnology firms sometimes had difficulty obtaining product patent
protection for protein products that were otherwise indistinguishable
from natural proteins in the prior art. After Congress amended the
Patent Act in 1988 to provide a remedy for the sale in the U.S. of a
product made abroad through a U.S.-patented process, 61 the rejection of
156 Id.
157 Id.
"'s Id. at 1411.
151 See, e.g., Karen G. Bender et al., Patent Decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit: The Year 1985 in Review, 35 AM. U. L. REv. 995, 1005
(1986) (criticizing the Federal Circuit's "disappointing decision in In re Durden"
which "clearly resulted from the court's refusal to state a general rule of law that a
process is automatically patentable by virtue of the patentability of the starting
material or end product" notwithstanding that patent law already "gives the owner of
a patent on a starting material or an end product the power to enjoin use of the
process of using the former and of making the latter").
'0 See Harold C. Wegner, Much Ado About Durden, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'y 785 (1989); Mark A. Litman, Obvious Process Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. 103, 71 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 775 (1989).
16 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100418,
§ 9003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1563-64 (1988). The Act added section 2 7 1 (g) to the patent
statute, providing in part:
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or sells or uses
within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in
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biotechnology process claims under the authority of In re Durden looked
like a significant loss to industry.
In two subsequent cases, the Federal Circuit overturned the PTO's
rejection of process claims, each time distinguishing In re Durden on
questionable grounds without overruling it, while reiterating that each
case presents unique facts. 61 In Judge Rich's 1990 opinion in In re
Pleuddemann, the Federal Circuit characterized the appealed claim in In
re Durden as being for "a method of making a compound," while the
claims at issue in In re Pleuddemann "are for methods of bonding/priming
by the use of novel agents invented by appellant for that particular
use."16 Judge Rich spun this distinction out a little further, inviting the
inference that methods of using nonobvious products are more likely to
be nonobvious and patentable than methods of making such products:
[T] he compounds and their use are but different aspects of, or ways
of looking at, the same invention and consequently that invention is
capable of being claimed both as new compounds or as a new
method or process of bonding/priming. On the other hand, a
process or method of making the compounds is a quite different
thing; they may have been made by a process which was new or old,
obvious or nonobvious. In this respect, therefore, there is a real
difference between a process of making and a process of using and
the cases dealing with one involve different problems from the
cases dealing with the other.
65
But this distinction failed to reconcile the cases to the satisfaction of
the PTO and the bar.
166
The issue returned to the Federal Circuit five years later in In re
Ochiai, on appeal from a rejection of a process of preparing a nonobvious
the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, sale, or
use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent ....
'6' The poster child for the biotechnology industry's concerns was EPO, a
therapeutic protein cloned by Amgen. Although Amgen held a patent on the isolated
gene for EPO and recombinant starting materials, because its process claims were
rejected under In re Durden, Chugai, a Japanese competitor, was able to use Amgen's
U.S.-patented materials in Japan and import the protein into the U.S. without any
infringement liability to Amgen. Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d
1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Hearings on H.R 587 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the H. Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement
of Steven M. Odre, Associate General Counsel, Amgen).
163 In re Pleuddemann, 910 F.2d 823 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
164 In re Pleuddemann, 910 F.2d. at 827 (emphasis in original).
165 Id.
'6 Indeed, the process deemed obvious in In reDurden, and distinguished in In re
Pleuddemann, was not simply a method of making nonobvious end products, but also a
method of using nonobvious starting materials. Moreover, the process at issue in In re
Pleuddemann had an end product-a bonded composite of polymerizable material




cephem compound using a nonobvious organic acid.167 The PTO allowed
claims to both the end product and the starting materials, but rejected
the process claims on the ground that they were drawn to a conventional
"method of making" and In re Durden therefore controlled. 16 While
defending the rejection before the Federal Circuit, the PTO Solicitor
asserted that there was an irreconcilable conflict in the cases that "makes
it very difficult for patent attorneys to give cogent advice to clients or for
patent examiners to render consistent decisions on the patentability
(under § 103) of processes involving the use of new and unobvious
starting materials."1 9 The Federal Circuit reversed the rejection in an
opinion that seemed to rest on the nonobviousness of the starting
materials to defeat the obviousness of the process:
The process invention Ochiai recites in claim 6 specifically requires
use of none other than its new, nonobvious acid as one of the
starting materials. One having no knowledge of this acid could
hardly find it obvious to make any cephem using this acid as an
acylating agent, much less the particular cephem recited in claim 6.
In other words, it would not have been obvious to those of ordinary
skill in the art to choose the particular acid of claim 6 as an
acylating agent for the known amine for the simple reason that the
particular acid was unknown but for Ochiai's disclosure in the '429
1701
application.
This analysis might seem to make any process that uses a new and
nonobvious product-including the process at issue in In re Durden-
nonobvious ipso facto, but the Federal Circuit denied (without
explanation) that the cases were in conflict or that it was applying a per
se rule:
The use of per se rules, while undoubtedly less laborious than a
searching comparison of the claimed invention-including all its
limitations-with the teachings of the prior art, flouts section 103
and the fundamental case law applying it. Per se rules that eliminate
the need for fact-specific analysis of claims and prior art may be
administratively convenient for PTO examiners and the Board. ....
But reliance on per se rules of obviousness is legally incorrect and
must cease. ... We once again hold today that our precedents do
not establish any per se rules of obviousness, just as those precedents
themselves expressly declined to create such rules.1
7
'
By this point the biotechnology industry had taken its case to
Congress, 17 and while In re Ochiai was pending before the Federal
117 71 F.3d 1565.
Id. at 1567-69.
Id. at 1569 (internal quotations omitted).
170 Id. at 1569-70.
7' Id. at 1572. See also In re Brouwer, 77 F.3d 422 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
172 Isabelle McAndrews, Reversing the Burden of Durden Through Legislation: HR
3957andHR 5664, 72J. PAT. &TRADEMARKOFF. SoC'Y188 (1990).
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Circuit, Congress amended section 103 to establish a per se rule of
nonobviousness for biotechnological processes.17  Under the amended
statute, a patent applicant may claim a process of using or making new
and nonobvious compositions of matter without having the process
claims separately examined for nonobviousness, provided the claims to
the process and to the composition of matter are in the same application
or in applications with the same effective filing date, owned by the same
person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person, and
set to expire on the same date. 74 The legislation is industry-specific and
includes a definition of "biotechnological process.' 75 Broader proposals
for changing the statute for all process claims were opposed by other
industries, notably including the chemical industry.
This episode sheds an interesting light on the pressures the Federal
Circuit faces in exercising appellate review of (non)obviousness
determinations. Notwithstanding its characterization as a question of law,
the (non)obviousness of an invention is a highly case-specific, fact-laden
inquiry that does not lend itself to generalizations across cases or bright-
line rules. Yet the mission of the Federal Circuit is to bring about greater
uniformity and predictability in the administration of the patent laws.
Both the patent bar and the PTO generally welcome greater clarity in the
applicable rules, although in the select universe of cases that come before
the Federal Circuit, the patent bar seeks rules that favor patentability
while the PTO seeks deference for its rejections. If either side becomes
sufficiently unhappy with how the Federal Circuit is performing, they
have access to two other institutions that occasionally intervene to change
the ground rules: Congress, which intervened to provide the per se rule
of patentability for biotechnology processes that the Federal Circuit
refused to grant in In re Durden, and the Supreme Court, which
intervened to relax the Federal Circuit's TSM approach in KSR
The rhetoric of the Federal Circuit in In re Durden, In re Pleuddemann,
and In re Ochiai sounds like it could have been written after the Supreme
Court's decision in KSR by a court that had taken to heart the
admonition to avoid the use of "rigid and mandatory formulas" and to
follow instead the Supreme Court's own "flexible and expansive"
approach. But even when the Federal Circuit affirms its commitment to
flexibility and analysis of each case on its facts, as it did repeatedly in In re
Durden, In re Pleuddemann, and In re Ochiai, it sometimes seems to have
difficulty explaining what differences in the cases are pertinent and
' Biotechnological Process Patents Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-41, § 103, 109
Stat. 351 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103(b)). The legislative history reflects two principal
concerns: providing certainty for patent applicants, and protecting the biotechnology
against foreign competition.
174 The process claims fall with the product claims-that is, if the product claims
are held invalid, and the basis for allowing the patent to issue on the process claims
was the nonobviousness of the product, the process shall no longer be considered




articulating just what sort of analysis it hopes to see in future cases.
Setting aside the rhetoric about the importance of analyzing each case on
its own facts, In re Durden says next to nothing about what facts make the
claimed process in that particular case obvious. In re Pleuddemann
appeared to highlight as a relevant consideration whether the claimed
process was to a "method of making" or a "method of use," with the
nonobviousness of the materials more likely to impart patentability to
"methods of use." But the court backed away from that distinction in In re
Ochiai (perhaps because it did not serve to reconcile the cases and made
no sense) and made no further effort to distinguish the facts of In re
Durden. Without providing a clearer account of the basis for its decisions,
flexible and expansive decision-making can become peremptory and
uninformative and thus fail to offer adequate guidance for resolving
future cases.
V. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS
Perhaps the most commercially significant patents governed by the
rules of chemical obviousness are pharmaceutical patents. 76 The Federal
Circuit has evaluated many pharmaceutical patents for obviousness in a
growing body of caselaw. Many of these cases consider the
(non)obviousness question in a different time frame than the cases
discussed in the previous Part. The rules for determining the obviousness
of chemicals developed primarily in the context of appeals from
rejections of patent claims by the PTO, initially to the CCPA and later to
the Federal Circuit. These cases were primarily about relatively new
inventions that had not yet received patent protection. By contrast, the
nonobviousness of drug patents today is more likely to be litigated in a
so-called "ANDA infringement" action at a much later stage, after a
product has been on the market for some time and is on the verge of
facing generic competition."'
176 Empirical studies indicate that this is an area where decision-makers really
care about patents when they contemplate spending money on R&D, in contrast to
other fields and industries that rate other, non-patent factors as more important.
W.M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions & Why
U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) in WORKING PAPER NO. 7552 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper Series, 2000); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the
Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
AcrIvrry 783 (1987).
177 "ANDA litigation" is patent infringement litigation that follows the filing of an
"Abbreviated New Drug Application" or ANDA, seeking FDA approval to market a
generic version of a previously approved product. Complex statutory provisions
specify when a firm may submit an ANDA and when the FDA may approve an ANDA
for a generic version of a new chemical entity, giving the innovator a period of FDA-
administered exclusivity of between 4 and 7 1/ years. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(0) (5) (F) (ii).
The duration of this exclusivity period turns in part on whether the generic product
would infringe patents that have been listed with the FDA, whether the firm
submitting an ANDA is challenging the patents, and whether the patent holder
20081
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The procedural context for these cases is somewhat idiosyncratic.
Patent law and drug regulation converge in ways that promote litigation
over the validity of drug patents when a generic competitor seeks to enterS 178
the market for a successful drug. The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984"79
streamlined the regulatory approval process for generic versions of drugs
previously approved by the FDA by allowing these products to use an
"Abbreviated New Drug Application," known as an ANDA, once
applicable patents have expired or been held invalid."" Almost inevitably,
as successful pharmaceutical products approach the end of their original
patent terms, their sponsors obtain additional patents on related
inventions to forestall generic entry. If a generic competitor seeks
regulatory approval prior to the expiration of any of these patents, it
must certify to the FDA that the patent is either invalid or will not be
infringed by its generic version of the product. At that point, the patent
owner has an opportunity to sue for infringement and to litigate the
patent issues prior to FDA approval of the generic product. To
encourage challenges to invalid patents, the Hatch-Waxman Act gives the
first successful patent challenger a six-month period of lucrative "generic
exclusivity" before it will approve another generic version of the same
product.
These provisions have provoked extensive patent litigation as
research pharmaceutical firms and generic competitors have explored
their strategic implications, giving the Federal Circuit many
opportunities to address the validity of drug patents. Because hundreds
of millions or even billions of dollars turn on how these disputes are
resolved, both plaintiffs and defendants182 may find it worthwhile to press
claims and arguments that have only a slim chance of carrying the day,
and appeals are typical. At this stage, the patents have issued and enjoy a
presumption of validity, and considerable information is available, to
both the patent holder and the challenger, about the product and its
properties from laboratory testing, clinical trials, and clinical experience.
The Federal Circuit scrutinizes these cases with great care and shows
considerable awareness of their unusual regulatory and strategic context.
In these cases the Federal Circuit has attempted to integrate the rules for
responds by filing a patent infringement action. For a summary and analysis of the
applicable law, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 345 (2007).
178 Id.
17' Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and
35) (commonly known as the "Hatch-Waxman Act").
'80 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000).
.8 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (5) (B) (iv).
112 Of course patent holders typically stand to earn more money from sales of a
product for which they face no competition than challengers stand to earn from
entering the market as generic competitors, and patent holder can therefore be
expected to spend much more on ANDA litigation than challengers.
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chemical obviousness within its broader (non) obviousness jurisprudence,
resulting in some doctrinal confusion. Nonetheless, overall the
(non) obviousness decisions of the Federal Circuit in pharmaceutical
cases reveal considerable flexibility and case-by-case analysis. In contrast
to cases decided on appeal from PTO rejections, in which inability to
meet the burden of producing unavailable evidence may be decisive,
infringement cases typically arrive at the Federal Circuit after a full
record has been developed in litigation, and analysis of nonobviousness is
more likely to reach the merits. Although there appear to be some
disagreements among the judges of the Federal Circuit and some
decisions have provoked sharp dissents, most panels do not display the
pro-patent bias that is sometimes attributed to that court.
From a formal perspective, there are reasons to expect the Federal
Circuit to show greater deference to obviousness determinations of the
PTO than to obviousness determinations of the district courts. The
Patent Act accords a presumption of validity to issued patents, and
challengers bear a burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence to
establish the obviousness of an invention that is covered by an issued
patent.8 3 Moreover, the Supreme Court admonished the Federal Circuit
in Dickinson v. Zurko that under the Administrative Procedure Act factual
findings of the PTO are entitled to greater deference than factual
findings of courts. 18 4 One might therefore expect the Federal Circuit to
display greater deference to findings of obviousness on appeals from
decisions of the PTO, before any patent has issued, while scrutinizing
more skeptically obviousness determinations by district courts that
overturn the validity of presumptively valid issued patents.B
5
In practice, however, the Federal Circuit seems if anything more
deferential toward the (non)obviousness determinations of trial courts.
One reason for this may be that most of the Federal Circuit's decisions
about (non)obviousness have turned on rules about proof rather than on
application of an actual substantive standard to determine the
(non) obviousness of an invention. In appeals from decisions of the PTO,
the evidentiary record is sparse, consisting primarily of documentary
prior art, and the burden of proof is therefore difficult to sustain. In high
83 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
814 527 U.S. 150, 164 (1999).
185 On the other hand, if one takes seriously judicial statements that the ultimate
conclusion as to (non)obviousness is a question of law, subject to de novo review on
appeal, one might expect appellate review to be substantially the same whether the
appeal is from the PTO or a court. In Graham, the Supreme Court noted that "the
primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable material lies in the Patent Office"
and complained that "[w]e have observed a notorious difference between the
standards applied by the Patent Office and by the courts," implying that the
(non)obviousness standard should be the same in both contexts. 383 U.S. 1, 18
(1966). The Court called upon the PTO to "strictly adhere to the 1952 Act as
interpreted here" in order to "bring about a closer concurrence between
administrative and judicial precedent." 383 U.S. at 18-19.
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stakes infringement litigation, by contrast, the parties have ample
opportunity and motivation to develop a full record, including expert
testimony and post-invention evidence of differences between the
invention and the prior art. In the face of such a record, the Federal
Circuit has relatively few moves available to overturn district court
decisions.
The Federal Circuit typically deploys the same analytical tools
whether it is reviewing (non)obviousness determinations of the PTO or
of the district courts. The Federal Circuit has folded its approach to
chemical obviousness, originally developed in reviewing decisions of the
PTO, into its articulation of the proper approach for district courts in
reviewing the validity of issued patents. Some aspects of the chemical
obviousness approach seem off point in this framework, resulting in
doctrinal confusion. For example, in the context of patent prosecution,
the burden is initially on the examiner to establish a prima facie case of
obviousness, typically through a showing of structural similarity to a
useful molecule in the prior art. Once this showing is made, the burden
then shifts to the applicant to rebut the prima facie case, typically by
showing that the claimed invention has unexpected properties not
possessed by the structurally similar prior art. This shifting of the burden
seems appropriate at the prosecution stage, when there is no
presumption of validity and little information is available about the
product. The examiner is in no position to know the properties of the
new chemical, but should be able to search the prior art for structurally
similar molecules. If this search reveals prior art that makes the invention
prima facie obvious, the applicant is in a better position than the
examiner to offer further evidence about the properties of the invention,
since only the applicant has had the opportunity to observe the new
chemical and to test its properties. It makes considerably less sense,
however, to place the same burden on the patent owner at the later stage
of patent enforcement. At this point, the patent enjoys a presumption of
validity, calling into question the logic of requiring the patentee to make
any showing of validity. Moreover, the challenger is likely to be a
commercial competitor who has knowledge of the properties of the
invention and opportunity to compare it to the prior art. In the
infringement context, the burden of proof of obviousness by clear and
convincing evidence formally remains on the challenger at all times, yet
the Federal Circuit still refers to the showing of structural similarity,S186
somewhat confusingly, as a "prima facie case" of obviousness.
In some cases the court has analyzed the (non) obviousness of
pharmaceutical products without resort to the special rules for evaluating
the patentability of chemicals. For example, a number of cases consider
the obviousness of pharmaceutical compositions that combine well-
known ingredients in a single formulation to treat symptoms that
' E.g., Pfizer, Inc., v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d, 1348 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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typically occur together. In Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., the Federal
Circuit affirmed a trial court judgment of invalidity for a claimed
formulation of ibuprofen and pseudoephedne in a "combinatory
immixture" for relief of cough, cold, and flu.18 The court concluded that
the invention would have been obvious in light of prior art that included
a combination of acetaminophen and pseudoephedrine, a combination
of aspirin and pseudoephedrine, and the practice of doctors to prescribe
ibuprofen in combination with pseudoephedrine, although not in a
"combinatory immixture."188 The court looked to features of the over-the-
counter (OTC) drug marketplace to explain the obviousness of the
invention. Noting that at the time of the invention it had been widely
reported that the FDA would soon approve ibuprofen for OTC sales, the
court surmised that this regulatory shift would motivate the OTC industry
to substitute ibuprofen for acetaminophen or aspirin to create a
combination product with superior analgesic properties and fewer side
effects. 89 Similarly, in McNeil-PPC v. L. Perrigo Co., the Federal Circuit
affirmed a trial court judgment of invalidity for a claimed method of
treating intestinal disorders characterized by both diarrhea and
flatulence by administering a combined pharmaceutical composition that
includes an effective antidiarrheal compound with the antiflatulent
compound simethicone.1 9° The prior art disclosed each of the
components and information about their dosing, products that
combined other antidiarrheals with simethicone, and more than twenty
publications that noted the concurrence of diarrhea and flatulence.
The court quoted at length from the district court's angry opinion
accusing the patent holder of filing and litigating patents on trivial
advances to extend its period of exclusivity for years beyond the
expiration of a basic patent on its best-selling product Immodium® A-
D. In each of these cases the court considered proffered evidence of
unexpected or synergistic results for the product and found it
unpersuasive.
By contrast, the Federal Circuit faulted the trial court for refusing to
consider evidence of surprising results for a combination product in
Knoll Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.9 3 The
Federal Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment of invalidity for a
patent that claimed methods and compositions for treating pain with a
combination of hydrocodone and ibuprofen.194 Although agreeing with
the trial court that the prior art suggested the combination, the Federal
122 F.3d 1476, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1483-84.
Id. at 1484.
'90 337 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
... Id. at 1369-70.
192 Id. at 1367-68.
367 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1382-83.
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Circuit found no prior art teaching or suggestion that the combination
would have an enhanced effect.19 5 The trial court had refused to consider
the patent holder's proffered evidence of surprising results on the theory
that these benefits were not discovered until after the patent had• 196
issued. The Federal Circuit held that it was error to exclude this post-
invention evidence in support of the patent:
Evidence developed after the patent grant is not excluded from
consideration, for understanding of the full range of an invention is
not always achieved at the time of filing the patent application. It is
not improper to obtain additional support consistent with the
patented invention, to respond to litigation attacks on validity.
There is no requirement that an invention's properties and
advantages were fully known before the patent application was filed,
or that the patent application contains all of the work done in
studying the invention, in order for that work to be introduced into
evidence in response to litigation attack. Nor is it improper to
conduct additional experiments and provide later-obtained data in
support of patent validity."'v
Although the Federal Circuit has been fairly consistent in holding
that evidence of surprising properties should be considered in evaluating
an invention for (non)obviousness, it often categorizes such evidence as
"secondary evidence" of nonobviousness, putting it in the same category
as evidence of commercial success, failure of others, and long-felt but
unsolved need.' 98 Evidence of surprising or unexpected properties is
unlike these other sources of "market" evidence that indicate obviousness
only through a chain of inferences. It is primary, technological evidence
going directly to the statutory inquiry as to "the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art."'9 9 As Judge Rich
explained in In re Papesch, "[firom the standpoint of patent law, a
compound and all of its properties are inseparable; they are one and the
same thing."20 0 In other words, evidence of the properties of a chemical is
directly relevant to show what the claimed invention is. The
characterization of this evidence as "secondary" seems fundamentally
confused, and it could make a difference if it leads to a discounting of
the relevance of surprising properties in the overall conclusion as to
obviousness.
The coding of surprising properties evidence as "secondary" may
have led the Federal Circuit to discount its relevance in its recent
decision in Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc. 20 The patent at issue in that case
' Id. at 1384-85.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 1385.
E.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc, 471 F.3d 1369, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1369-72 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
'"" 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A 1963).20 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 110 (2007).
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claimed the besylate salt of amlodipine, the active ingredient in the
2012blood pressure medication Norvasc@. The prior art included besylate
salts of other compounds, as well as Pfizer's own prior patent covering all
pharmaceutically acceptable acid addition salts of amlodipine, but no
203
reference explicitly mentioned the besylate salt of amlodipine °. After
beginning clinical trials with its originally preferred maleate salt Pfizer
encountered problems with instability and stickiness, and made and
204tested other amlodipine salts to find one that was easier to handle.
Finding that the besylate salt was the best, Pfizer changed to the besylate
salt in its clinical trials, and patented it.20 5 Three district courts upheld the
validity of the patent, but a Federal Circuit panel reversed. The panel
held that on the evidence presented a reasonable fact-finder could only
conclude that "Apotex has shown by clear and convincing evidence that
the skilled artisan would ... have been ... motivated to combine the
prior art to produce the besylate salt of amlodipine," and that "the skilled
artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success with the
besylate salt form of amlodipine.
2 0 6
The panel then turned to a consideration of "secondary
considerations," and under this heading addressed the district court's
conclusion that the besylate salt was nonobvious because it was more
207
stable and less sticky than the maleate salt of amlodipine. The court
held that the record failed to show that these properties were
unexpected, noting that both the maleate salt and the besylate salt were
therapeutically effective, as were the other acid addition salts, and that
the selection of the besylate salt for its superior ease of handling and
projected shelf-life "proves nothing more than routine optimization that
would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art."20 8 The court
went on to offer as an alternative ground for its decision that mere
"secondary" evidence of superior properties was not sufficient to
overcome the strong prima facie case of obviousness:
Alternatively, we hold that even if Pfizer showed that amlodipine
besylate exhibits unexpectedly superior results, this secondary
consideration does not overcome the strong showing of obviousness
in this case. Although secondary considerations must be taken into
account, they do not necessarily control the obviousness
conclusion. Here, the record establishes such a strong case of




20' Id. at 1361-62.
2o4 Id. at 1353-54.
215 Id. at 1354-55.
Id. at 1361.
2o Id. at 1369-70.
Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1372 (citation omitted).
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Since this was an alternative ground of decision, it is difficult to say
whether the coding of the superior properties of amlodipine besylate as
"secondary evidence" made a difference. The fact that the court went to
the trouble of laying out multiple pathways to its invalidity conclusion
suggests that it felt highly motivated to find the patent invalid. Perhaps
the court was influenced by the fact, noted in its opinion, that Pfizer's
original patent covering all pharmaceutically acceptable salts of
amlodipine, including amlodipine besylate, had by this point expired at
the end of its extension term." ° The subsequent patent on amlodipine
besylate may have seemed like improper patent "evergreening" of a
product that had already enjoyed a healthy term of patent protection and
belonged in the public domain."
Another way of understanding the decision in Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex,
Inc. is that the superior properties of the besylate salt were not surprising
enough to make the choice of one salt over another nonobvious:
[T]he record is devoid of any evidence of what the skilled artisan
would have expected. We will not simply presume that the skilled
artisan would have expected that amlodipine besylate would have
the same characteristics as amlodipine maleate, because as Pfizer
asserts, its properties are not absolutely predictable.... Unrebutted
testimony from Apotex's expert evidences that, given the range of
53 anions disclosed by Berge, one skilled in the art would expect
those anions to provide salts having a range of properties, some of
which would be superior, and some of which would be inferior, to
amlodipine maleate .... The fact that amlodipine besylate was the
best of the seven acid addition salts actually tested proves nothing
more than routine optimization that would have been obvious to
one of ordinary skill in the art.
The Federal Circuit has been more generous in finding unexpected
properties when the claimed invention is a new drug with a distinct safety
and efficacy profile relative to the prior art, even if the prior art discloses
210 Id. at 1353 n.2. Drug developers are entitled to extend the term of protection
for one patent per product in order to make up for some of the time lost seeking
regulatory approval. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000). In this case, the patent selected for
extension was the broader patent covering all pharmaceutically acceptable salts, not
the narrower patent in suit that covered only the besylate salt. Paul Johnson, in
thoughtful comments on an earlier draft, suggests that the court may have been
motivated to invalidate the patent on the eve of its expiration so that Apotex, as the
patent challenger, could claim the benefit of a 180-day period of "generic exclusivity"
before other ANDAs could be approved. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
.1 See aLso In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1096-98 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding
invalid for obviousness a patent with a priority date twenty-seven years prior to date of
opinion on a method of treating depression by administering amitriptyline over prior
art disclosing amtriptyline, structurally similar imipramine, use of imipramine to treat
depression, and explicit suggestion to try amtriptyline as a treatment for depression)
The Federal Circuit has used a variety of doctrinal tools to invalidate "evergreening"
patents. See Eisenberg, supra note 177.
212 480 F.3d at 1371 (emphases in original).
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structurally similar molecules. One way that the Federal Circuit has
sometimes upheld patentability for such products is by asking whether
the most structurally similar prior art would have been selected as a "lead
compound" in developing a new drug. For example, in Yamanouchi
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed
a district court judgment as a matter of law upholding the validity of a
patent claiming famotidine, sold under the brand name Pepcid®.'
1 3
Famotidine was a member of a class of drugs called H [2] antagonists, and
the prior art disclosed thousands of H[2] antagonists, including a
structurally similar molecule that was set forth as example 44 in a prior
214patent to Yamanouchi. In affirming the district court, the Federal
Circuit recited a series of steps that Danbury failed to show a PHOSITA
would have been motivated to take in order to arrive at famotidine,
beginning with the selection of example 44 as a lead compound, followed
215by further combinations and substitutions. The court remarked upon
the markedly superior properties of famotidine over the prior art,
although ultimately concluding that it was unnecessary to consider "the
strong objective evidence of non-obviousness" because Danbury failed
216
even to make a prima facie showing of obviousness.
The Federal Circuit cited Yamanouchi with approval in Eli Lilly &
217Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals, Inc., in which it affirmed a district
court judgment that the challenger had failed to establish the invalidity
of a patent on the anti-schizophrenia drug olanzapine. Olanzapine was a
novel member of a family of compounds that included clozapine, an anti-
schizophrenia drug that had been taken off the market years earlier
because of its bad side effects. The prior art disclosed a number of
structurally similar compounds including Compound 222, an adjacent
homolog of olanzapine. The district court found that the prior art would
not have motivated a PHOSITA to use Compound 222 as a lead
compound because it contained a hydrogen atom in the place of a
flourine atom that was thought essential to the antipsychotic properties
of clozapine and other antipsychotics. The challengers argued on appeal
that the district court erred by requiring them to "establish a teaching or
incentive to treat the closest prior art (i.e., Compound '222) as a 'lead
compound"' rather than permitting them to establish prima facie
obviousness based on disclosure in the prior art of an adjacent
homolog.218 In affirming the district court's rejection of the obviousness
challenge, the Federal Circuit analyzed the facts in a way that blended
consideration of the prima facie case and rebuttal evidence. They
reiterated the district court's finding that defendants had failed to show
2"13 231 F.3d 1339, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
214 Id. at 1343-44.
215 Id. at 1344-45.
216 Id. at 1345.
27 471 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
211 Id. at 1377.
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that a PHOSITA would have selected Compound 222 as a lead
compound, without disapproving of this threshold requirement, in
considering whether the prior art would have motivated or taught away
from the structural modifications that were necessary to make
olanzapine. They also noted that Lilly had proved "extensive secondary
considerations to rebut obviousness," including unexpected results.210
The Federal Circuit followed a similar analysis in its post-KSR
opinion in Takeda Chemical Industries v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., affirming a
district court judgment that the challenger had failed to establish the
obviousness of a patent on pioglitazone, the active ingredient in the
• 220
successful Type 2 diabetes drug ACTOS®. The prior art included prior
patents to Takeda. One of these patents, the '200 patent, disclosed a
genus of thiazolidine (TZD) compounds and specifically identified fifty-
four compounds, including compound b. Compound b was structurally
similar to pioglitazone, and the prosecution history of the '200 patent
included data showing that compound b had antidiabetic properties.
Another prior art patent of Takeda, the '779 patent, specifically claimed
compound b, and the prosecution history identified it as especially
important. But another prior art reference, Sodha II, disclosed data from
studies of 101 TZD compounds and singled out compound b as causing
"considerable increases in body weight and brown fat weight." ' Sodha II
identified three compounds, not including compound b, as being the
most favorable in terms of toxicity and activitiy. The district court
concluded that the prior art as a whole would not have led a PHOSITA to
select compound b as a lead compound, and therefore concluded that
Alphapharm had failed to show prima facie obviousness by clear and
convincing evidence. In affirming, the Federal Circuit panel further
noted that the district court "found nothing in the prior art to suggest
making the specific molecular modifications to compound b that are
necessary to achieve the claimed compounds," crediting expert testimony
222that these steps were not routine at the time. The Federal Circuit
recited, evidently with approval, the district court's conclusions that a
PHOSITA would not have expected these modifications to ameliorate
223the unwanted side effects of compound b. Moreover, Takeda's showing
that pioglitazone lacked these side effects was sufficient to rebut any
224
showing of prima facie obviousness.
210 Id. at 1380.
220 492 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
221 Id. at 1358.
22 Id. at 1360.
2 Id. at 1362-63. This is arguably inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
statement in KSR that the focus of (non)obviousness analysis should not be limited to
the problem that the inventor was trying to solve, but should consider more broadly
whether the claimed invention would have been an obvious solution to any other
problem at the time that might have motivated its creation. 127 S. Ct. at 1742.
224 Id. at 1362.
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The focus on whether a PHOSITA would have selected the closest
prior art molecule as a "lead compound" is an interesting move that
makes it easier to establish nonobviousness for new chemical entities that
have not previously been developed as drugs. New drugs are often
structurally similar to prior art compounds that, for one reason or
another, have not been selected for development through clinical trials.
A robust nonobviousness standard would present a risk that these
undeveloped products would stand as an obstacle not only to their own
future development, but also to the future development of any
225
structurally similar compounds. The lead compound approach makes it
easier for a firm that later revisits these previously unpromising products
and modifies them to serve new purposes to obtain patent protection on
new modifications, thereby preserving incentives to undertake the
further investment in clinical trials necessary to bring these products to
market. At the same time, it excludes from patent protection similar
modifications of more salient products, such as already successful drugs,
because a PHOSITA would clearly be motivated to use a successful drug
as a lead compound in future research. The practical effect is to make it
more difficult to obtain evergreening patents on new versions of
successful products, while still preserving opportunities to patent
modified versions of less salient products that are nonetheless disclosed
in the prior art. This approach shows flexibility in adapting
(non) obviousness doctrine to the context of biopharmaceutical research
and development.
If the Federal Circuit has been especially generous in evaluating the
(non)obviousness of new therapeutic agents, it has been especially
skeptical of claims for new formulations of old products, particularly
when the results are unsurprising. For example, in Alza Corp. v. Mylan
Laboratories, Inc.,226 the court began its analysis of a patent on a once-daily,
controlled-release formulation of the anti-incontinence drug oxybutynin
with the observation that "[o] nce-a-day dosing provides the usual benefits
of convenience, steady-dosing, and in addition, possibly reduced
absorption of a metabolite that leads to side-effects. 2 Alza argued that
an extended release formulation for oxybutynin would have been
nonobvious at the time it was made because a PHOSITA would not have
believed that oxybutynin could be absorbed in the colon and would
therefore have lacked motivation to make such a formulation. But in the
face of expert testimony to the contrary, the Federal Circuit deferred to
the district court's finding of an implicit motivation and expectation of
228
success for the claimed formulation. Similarly, in Merck & Co. v. Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit held invalid a patent on a
25 See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87
TEXAS L. REv. (forthcoming 2008).
226 464 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
22' Id. at 1288.
22 Id. at 1293.
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method for treating and preventing osteoporosis by administering
biphosphonate compounds on a less than daily basis. 9 The patent
holder argued that the prior art revealed gastrointestinal side effects for
the product, including dose-related irritation to the esophagus, that
made the success of such a regimen unexpected, and the district court
agreed, but the Federal Circuit reversed, citing a prior art reference that
proposed weekly dosing to improve patient compliance.
An important area in which the decisions of the Federal Circuit have
been mixed concerns the patentability of claims to a particular
enantiomer of a drug-i.e. a particular spatial arrangement of the
constituent atomic elements of the drug molecule around a chiral
center-when the prior art discloses a mixture (called a racemic mixture
or racemate) of two possible enantiomers. 31 Often either the therapeutic
benefits or side effects of a drug having one chiral center are attributable
to only one enantiomer in the racemate, and resolving the racemate (i.e.,
purifying out the enantiomer with the desired effects) may thus provide a
superior product. A series of old decisions of the CCPA held that the
isolation of a single stereoisomer from a racemic mixture was prima facie
obvious, but that this prima facie showing of obviousness could be
• 232
rebutted by evidence of unexpected results. The Federal Circuit has
revisited these rules repeatedly in recent years.
Siding with the patent holder, the Federal Circuit upheld a district
court grant of a preliminary injunction against infringement of a patent
claiming a particular enantiomer of a particular salt of a compound
called MATTPCA (the active ingredient in Plavix®) in Sanofi-Synthelabo v.
Apotex, Inc. 233 The panel, in an opinion authored by Judge Lourie, noted
"the deferential standard we apply in reviewing grants or denials of
preliminary injunctions" and the presumption of validity in concluding
229 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
210 Id. at 1373-75.
231 It has long been known that for many chemicals, including drugs, the same
constituent atomic elements may form different spatial arrangements called isomers.
Generally speaking, stereoisomers are isomers whose three-dimensional shape is
dictated by the arrangement of covalent bonds to an atom known as a chiral center.
Some stereoisomers, called enantiomers, are mirror images of each other. A mixture
of equal amounts of the two enantiomers of a molecule with a single chiral center is
called a racemic mixture or racemate. Some compounds have two or more chiral
centers, resulting in multiple possible spatial arrangements known as diastereomers.
The Federal Circuit considered the patentability of a single diastereomer over a prior
art disclosure of a mixture of diastereomers in Aventis Pharma Deutschland v. Lupin,
discussed infra, footnotes 242-46.
232 See, e.g., In re Adamson, 275 F.2d 952, 954-55 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (holding
isolated stereoisomer obvious over racemic mixture of stereoisomers, given
insufficient showing of unexpected result); cf In re May, 574 F.2d 1082, 1090-94
(C.C.P.A. 1978) (holding isolated stereoisomer nonobviousness over racemic mix,
despite prima facie obviousness, because of unexpected property of being
nonaddictive).
2" 470 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the challenger
failed to establish a likelihood of proving invalidity at trial.2 4 The prior
art included an earlier patent claiming MATTPCA, but without explicitly
describing its stereoisomers or salts. The district court concluded that the
prior art would not motivate a PHOSITA to pursue the claimed
enantiomer of the bisulfate salt of MATTPCA, noting "the
unpredictability of the pharmaceutical properties of the enantiomers and
the potential for enantiomers to racemize in the body, ... [and] the
extensive time and money Sanofi spent developing the racemate before
redirecting its efforts toward the enantiomer, and the unpredictability of
salt formation."23 5 The district court also concluded that any evidence of
prima facie obviousness was rebutted by evidence of the unexpected
properties of high pharmacological activity and low toxicity.
236The Federal Circuit distinguished the 1960 case of In re Adamson.
In that case the CCPA had affirmed rejection of claims to a particular
enantiomer of a compound and its acid addition salts as obvious in view
of disclosure in the prior art of (1) compounds of the same formula
without mention of racemic mixtures or enantiomers and (2) methods of
separating racemic mixtures into their enantiomers.237 The panel noted
two grounds for distinction: first, while it was undisputed in Adamson that
the prior art disclosed racemic mixtures of the enantiomers and their
acid addition salts, in the instant case the prior art "does not disclose the
bisulfate salt of the d-enantiomer of MATTPCA"; and second, in the
instant case "the district court made factual findings that resolving the
racemate was not mere routine experimentation and that it was
unexpected that the desirable activity of clopidogrel would be found only
in the d-enantiomer. ' 238 These findings, which the panel did not find
clearly erroneous, were sufficient to distinguish Adamson and to affirm
the preliminary injunction.
In Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Ivax Pharmaceuticals, Inc., another
decision authored by Judge Lourie, a different Federal Circuit panel
again focused on the difficulty of resolving the racemate into distinct
enantiomers, as well as on failure of the prior art to predict which
enantiomer would prove more valuable, in affirming the district court's
finding that a patent claiming a substantially pure enantiomer had notS - 239
been proven invalid. The patent at issue in that case covered a
substantially pure (+)-enantiomer of the drug citalopram, a selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitor, and non-toxic acid addition salts thereof.
The plaintiff also owned an expired patent on the racemic form of
citalopram. The challengers argued that (+)-citalopram was obvious in
234 Id. at 1375.
235 Id. at 1378-79.
236 275 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
137 Id. at 954-55.
231 Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d at 1380.
2" 501 F.3d 1263, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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light of disclosure in the prior art of racemic citalopram and techniques
to separate enantiomers from a racemic mix. A prior art reference
(Smith) predicted that one citalopram enantiomer in the racemic mix
would be more potent than the other, but incorrectly predicted that the
(-)-enantiomer would be more potent rather than the (+)-enantiomer
claimed in the patent at issue. 240 The district court found that the Smith
reference did not enable a PHOSITA to obtain substantially pure (+)-
citalopram, that many chemists had failed in their efforts to resolve
racemic citalopram, and that a PHOSITA attempting to resolve racemic
citalopram would have had no reasonable expectation of success. 4' The
district court further credited the plaintiffs rebuttal evidence
demonstrating the difficulty of separating the enantiomers and the
unexpected properties of (+)-citalopram, which had twice the potency of
the racemic mix.242 The Federal Circuit affirmed, again concluding that
the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous. Surprisingly, the
Federal Circuit opinion in Forest Laboratories did not even cite the decision
of the Supreme Court in KStA which had come down more than four
months earlier.
A week later a different Federal Circuit panel came out the other
way, following careful analysis of KSR, in Aventis Pharma Deutschland
GMBH v. Lupin, Ltd.243 The drug at issue in that case, the ACE-inhibitor
ramipril, had five chiral centers that could each take either of two special
orientations of the surrounding atoms (R or S), for a total of 25 (i.e. 32)
possible stereoisomers. The district court had concluded after a bench
trial that the challenger failed to show by clear and convincing evidence
that the claimed invention, 5(S) ramipril in a formulation "substantially
free of other isomers," would have been obvious at the time it was made
in light of the prior art. The closest prior art disclosed a mixture of two
stereoisomers of ramipril, the 5(S) form and the SSSSR form, while the
claimed invention was substantially pure 5(S) ramipril. The district court
had noted that this was a close case and that the outcome might have
been different if the burden of proof had been by a preponderance of
the evidence rather than by clear and convincing evidence. Deciding the
case prior to KSR, the district court found insufficient evidence of
244
motivation to purify 5(S) ramipril. The Federal Circuit panel reversed,
concluding that "[r]equiring an explicit teaching to purify the 5(S)
stereoisomer from a mixture in which it is the active ingredient is
precisely the sort of rigid application of the TSM test that was criticized in
KSR "2 4 In the chemical arts, the court continued, structural similarity to
a prior art compound has long been sufficient to provide an implicit
214 Id. at 1268.
241 Id. at 1268-69.
241 Id. at 1269.
21' 499 F.3d 1293, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
244 Id. at 1299.
2145 Id. at 1301.
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motivation to make the claimed subject matter in the expectation that it
will have similar properties to the prior art. "The analysis is similar where,
as here, a claimed composition is a purified form of a mixture that
existed in the prior art .... isolation of interesting compounds is a
mainstay of the chemist's art., 246 Given that the prior art taught that the
stereoisomers of ramipril could be separated by conventional methods,
the purified 5(S) stereoisomer was prima facie obvious. The panel was
unimpressed by rebuttal evidence that 5(S) ramipril was eighteen times
as potent as the next most potent stereoisomer, the RRSSS form. The
proper comparison was not to the next most potent stereoisomer, but to
the racemic mix of the 5 (S) and SSSSR stereoisomers that constituted the
closest prior art. Moreover, "the potency of pure 5 (S) ramipril is precisely
what one would expect, as compared to a mixture containing other, inert
or near-inert stereoisomers. 2 4 ' The court concluded that the patent
holder had failed to rebut the case of prima facie obviousness by showing
unexpected results.
These cases are not necessarily inconsistent with each other. Each
opinion reviews a different evidentiary record to determine whether the
prior art would have motivated a PHOSITA to isolate the claimed isomer
with a reasonable expectation of success, whether the prior art taught the
PHOSITA how to do so, and whether the isolated molecule exhibits
surprising properties. The facts of each case are unique. Nonetheless, it is
difficult to find a basis for distinguishing the cases that would provide
meaningful guidance in future cases. Given that each case involved a
claim to a stereoisomer of a successful drug, it is difficult to argue that
the prior art did not provide motivation to resolve the racemic mixture.
Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish the cases on the basis of differences
in properties for the claimed stereoisomer relative to the prior art
racemic mixture. Perhaps Forest Laboratories and Aventis Pharma
Deutschland may be distinguished on the basis of the degree of difficulty
involved in separating the prior art mixture into purified stereoisomers.
But the focus on the method of arriving at the purified stereoisomer,
reminiscent of the analysis of the (non)obviousness of DNA sequence
claims prior to the decisions in In re Bell and In re Deuel,248 is at least in
tension with the admonition in those and other cases that the proper
focus in evaluating a product for (non)obviousness should be on the
product itself rather than on the method of making it.
249
246 Id. at 1301-02.
247 Id. at 1302.
248 See supra notes 8, 19 and accompanying text.
241 Paradoxically, it was Judge Lourie who both adamantly discredited the
approach of focusing on cloning methods in evaluating the (non)obviousness of
DNA sequences in In re Bell and In re Deuel, and who emphasized the difficulty of
resolving the racemic mixture into its constituent enantiomers in Forest Laboratories v.
Ivax.
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The decision in Aventis Pharma Deutschland provides some evidence
that the Federal Circuit is taking the Supreme Court's decision in KSR to
heart in evaluating pharmaceutical patents for obviousness. But even
prior to that decision, the Federal Circuit was deploying its
nonobviousness toolkit with special care and flexibility in pharmaceutical
patent cases. In this context, especially when it has the benefit of a full
record in the trial court, the Federal Circuit has shown a willingness to
look at all the evidence, including post-invention evidence of the
properties of the invention, to distinguish nonobvious inventions from
the routine results of ordinary skill and common sense. It has not
confined its attention to the explicit teachings of documentary
references, but has shown a keen awareness of how the workings of the
pharmaceutical marketplace structure incentives to modify existing
products. It has, in other words, been doing all along what the Supreme
Court criticized it for failing to do in KSR
Comparing the decisions of the Federal Circuit on the
(non)obviousness of pharmaceutical patents with its broader
(non)obviousness jurisprudence, it sometimes seems that the Federal
Circuit is more inclined to find the pharmaceutical patents invalid.
Perhaps this is because the pharmaceutical industry is obtaining and
seeking to enforce many invalid patents. Lucrative exclusivity in the
market for a successful drug may make it seem worthwhile to pursue
questionable patents as far as the courts will permit. In addition to the
possibility of getting a judicial remedy, the filing of an infringement
action against a generic challenger may forestall FDA approval of the
generic product for a thirty-month period, even if the patent is ultimately
held invalid. But pharmaceutical profits also motivate generic challengers
to show invalidity, especially given the provision in the Hatch-Waxman
Act for a profitable six month head-start for the first successful generic
challenger.
By the time these cases come before the Federal Circuit, there is a
full record available to help the court separate the wheat from the chaff,
enabling it to get beyond the limitations in the evidentiary record that
often make appeals from decisions of the PTO turn on allocation of the
burden of proof rather than on the merits. Perhaps the Federal Circuit is
more willing to find patents invalid on the basis of a full record, while on
the lighter record available in appeals from PTO decisions it is more
inclined to give patent applicants the benefit of a doubt.
The Federal Circuit showed little deference to the PTO's decision to
250
reject for obviousness in In re Sullivan, just a few months after KSR. The
invention at issue in that case was an antivenom composition for treating
snake bites. The claimed composition used only a fragment, called a Fab
fragment, of a whole antibody derived from the serum of an animal
exposed to the venom. The prior art disclosed whole antibodies against
250 498 F.3d 1345, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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snake venom, a method for producing Fab antibodies in place of whole
antibodies, and the use of Fab antibodies to detect snake toxins. The
applicant sought to distinguish this prior art through amended claim
language specifying an intended use for treating snake bites and reciting
that the composition neutralizes the lethality of snake venom, but the
examiner rejected this argument on the ground that the compound was
the same regardless of its use. The Board affirmed, concluding that a
PHOSITA would have expected the claimed composition to neutralize
the lethality of snake venom. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that
the Board erred in failing to consider rebuttal evidence offered by the
applicant that the prior art discouraged the use of Fab fragments for this
purpose. The court acknowledged KSR in a fleeting reference 25' after
conceding that the record was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
obviousness. Without concluding that the Board's finding of obviousness
was wrong, the Federal Circuit nonetheless vacated and remanded,
holding that "the Board must give [the proffered rebuttal evidence]
meaningful consideration before arriving at its conclusion.'2 2 Although it
is treacherous to draw conclusions from one case, In re Sullivan suggests
that the Federal Circuit may continue to set high standards for the PTO
to document the basis for its obviousness rejections, even after KSRI,
making it costlier and more difficult to enter rejections.
There are, of course, also costs to a system that errs on the side of
issuing patents that ultimately prove invalid. These costs are amplified in
the context of drug patents because of the complex interplay between
patents and drug regulation. While invalid patents keep generic
competitors out of the market, consumers pay higher prices for drugs.
But determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the
time it was made is a complex task that takes time to do right. The more
flexible and expansive the analysis, and the broader the range of
evidence that can be considered, the longer it takes. The characterization
of the nonobviousness conclusion as a question of law, subject to plenary
review on appeal, further delays the ultimate day of reckoning. A
paradoxical result of KSR may thus be to prolong the time it takes to
clear invalid patents out of the marketplace, even when the challengers
ultimately prevail.
VI. CONCLUSION
In pursuit of its mandate to make patent law more certain and
predictable, and in order to ensure that the PTO and district courts
evaluate patentability as of the time an invention was made without resort
to hindsight, the Federal Circuit has deployed a variety of mechanisms to
guide evaluations of (non)obviousness. In KSR v. Telefiex, the Supreme
Court disapproved as unduly rigid the Federal Circuit's use of one of
5' Id. at 1351.
152 Id. at 1353.
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these mechanisms, its "TSM" test, thereby calling into question other
mechanisms that constrain the flexibility of the (non)obviousness
inquiry. One such mechanism is the proof structure for evaluating the
(non)obviousness of chemical and biopharmaceutical inventions,
elaborated in a long line of cases from the CCPA and the Federal Circuit
but never approved by the Supreme Court. The Federal Circuit has
sometimes deployed this proof structure in a highly rigid and formalistic
manner, especially in cases from the 1990s considering the
(non)obviousness of claims to DNA sequences encoding known proteins.
For the most part, however, it has used a more flexible analysis in
evaluating the (non)obviousness of pharmaceutical patents. As a result, it
has recently held many such patents invalid in the context of ANDA
infringement litigation. Perhaps these cases, which are triggered by
challenges to patent validity by generic competitors seeking regulatory
approval to sell competing versions of successful products, reflect a
selection bias in favor of weak patents, or perhaps the Federal Circuit has
become suspicious that the pharmaceutical industry is improperly
obtaining "evergreening" patents on trivial variations that do not involve
true innovation. For whatever reason, it appears that in these cases the
Federal Circuit has been using all along the flexible, market-sensitive
analysis that the Supreme Court has commended to it in KS/? A review of
these cases suggests that the pharmaceutical industry does indeed have a
problem with the (non)obviousness test, but the problem is not KSR. The
problem is that many of the patents it relies upon are invalid under time-
honored patent doctrine, and with the benefit of a full evidentiary
record, these patents cannot withstand validity challenges. But unless
KSR permits the PTO to reject these claims in the first instance, on the
basis of a more limited record, consumers will continue to pay premium
prices on these products until challengers are able to demonstrate, under
an expansive and flexible analysis, that the patents covering those
products are invalid.
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